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LABOR LAW 
I. CALIFORNIA STATE COUNCIL v. ASSOCIATED GEN-
ERAL CONTRACTORS OF CALIFORNIA: NO LABOR 
MARKET PER SE EXEMPTION FROM THE ANTI-
TRUST LAWS FOR EMPLOYERS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated 
General Contractors of California,l the Ninth Circuit held that 
the union's allegations of an employers' boycott of unionized 
firms properly stated a cause of action under the Sherman Act-
and that the employers' conspiracy was not immune from anti-
trust liability by virtue of labor's antitrust exemptions.s 
The California State Council of Carpenters (the \inion) rep-
resents carpenters and affiliated local unions in negotiating 
master bargaining agreements with the Associated General Con-
tractors of California (AGCC), a multi-employer bargaining 
group.· The union sued the AGCC alleging the employer group 
and its individual members had violated the Sherman Antitrust 
Act by conspiring among themselves and with landowners and 
other employers to hire only nonunionized subcontractors,' with 
1. 648 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Pregerson, J.; the other panel members were 
Alarcon, J. and Sneed, J., dissenting) (rehearing and rehearing En Banc denied). 
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). For relevant text of § 1, Bee text accompanying note 14 
infra. 
3. 648 F.2d at 540. 
4. Id. at 529. 
5. Id. at 529-30. The complaint alleged in paragraph XXIV that, inter alia, the de-
fendants had conspired to, and had: 
(3) Advocated, encouraged, induced and aided non-mem-
bers of defendant Associated General Contractors of Califor-
nia, Inc., to refuse to enter into collective bargaining relation-
ships with plaintiffs and each of them; 
(4) Advocated, encouraged, induced, coerced, aided and 
encouraged owners of land and other letters of construction 
contracts to hire contractors and subcontractors who are not 
signatories to collective bargaining agreements with plaintiff's 
and each of them; 
247 
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the ultimate purpose of weakening and destroying the union.-
The union alleged actual damages of $25 million to be trebled to 
$75 million.' 
The district court granted the AGCC's motion to dismiss. It 
determined that the union's claim essentially was that the 
AGCC had "violated the antitrust laws insofar as they declined 
to enter into agreements with plaintiffs to deal only with sub-
contractors which were signatories to contracts with plaintiffs.'" 
The district court held the AGCC did not violate the antitrust 
laws and that the type of agreement the union sought was "pre-
cisely the type of agreement which subjected the union in Con- . 
nell to antitrust liability."8 The district court further held that a 
union could not state a cause of action under the antitrust laws 
against an employer "in the normal type of ' labor dispute" and 
dismissed the complaint.lo 
The Ninth Circuit reversed. It found that the district court 
mischaracterized the union's complaint which, when properly 
construed, did state a cause of action under the Sherman Act.n 
The court also found that the employers' conduct was not ex-
empt from antitrust liability simply because it arose in a labor-
management context. 11 The panel held that an employers' con-
spiracy which is ultimately aimed at weakening the union and 
also restrains competition among parties outside the collective 
bargaining relationship is actionable by the union under the 
Sherman Act.11 
(5) Advocated, induced, coerced, encouraged, and aided 
members of Associated General Contractors of California, Inc., 
non-members of Associated General Contractors, Inc., and 
"memorandum contractors" to enter into 8ubcontracting 
agreements with subcontractors who are not signatories to any 
collective bargaining agreements with plaintiffs and each of 
them. 
Complaint at 7. 
6. Id. at 8. 
7. Id. at 9. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that any person has the right to 
sue for treble damages "who shall be injured in his busineBB or property by reason of 
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). 
8. 404 F. Supp. 1067, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 1975). 
9. Id. (citing Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975». 
10. 404 F. Supp. at 1070. 
11. 648 F.2d at 532. 
12. Id, at 540. 
13.Id. 
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The Ninth Circuit panel faced four main questions in Cali-
fornia State Council: 
(1) Did the allegations contained in the union's 
complaint state a violation of the Sherman Act on 
the part of the AGCC? 
(2) Was this conduct exempt from the antitrust 
laws because of labor's statutory exemption? 
(3) Was this conduct exempt from the antitrust 
laws because of labor's nonstatutory exemption? 
(4) Did the union have standing to bring this 
action? 
B. BACKGROUND 
The Sherman Act and the Statutory Labor Exemption 
The Sherman Act, passed in 1890, provides in part that 
"[e]very contract, combination ... or conspiracy in restraint of 
trade or commerce. . . is . . . illegal."14 While the Sherman Act 
has been read broadly, III it does not reach every conspiracy re-
straining trade but is limited to those that affect commercial 
competition. UI To restrict the courts from using the antitrust 
laws as a means of controlling union conduct,1'7 Congress enacted 
the Clayton Actl8 in 1914. Section 618 of that Act provides that 
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). 
15. "The Statute does not confine its protection to consumers, or to purchasers, or 
to competitors, or to sellers .... [It protects] all who are made victims of the forbidden 
practices by whomever they may be perpetrated." Mandeville Island Farms v. American 
Crystal Sugar, 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948). See also Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 
Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (conspiracy against one merchant held illegal); Fashion Origina-
tor's Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (~rcive group boycott restricting commercial 
competition held illegal regardleB8 of its reasonableneB8). 
16. Apex Hosiery v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940). See also Neeld v. National Hockey 
League, 594 F.2d 442, 452 (9th Cir. 1979). 
17. Loewe v. Lawlor (Danburry Hatters), 208 U.S. 274 (1908) (secondary boycott of 
a manufacturer found to violate the Sherman Act). See D. LESLIE, CASES AND MATERIALS 
ON LABOR LAW, 430 (1979) ("The Sherman Act was p88Bed ... to curtail busineBB mo-
nopolies ... [but it was initially) applied ... more often to union than to employer 
busineB8 activity."). 
18. Act of Oct. 15, 1914, Pub. L. No. 212, 38 Stat. 730 (current version at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 12-27, 44 (1976); 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1976». 
19. Section 6 of the Clayton Act provides: 
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or articl/! 
of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be 
construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor ... 
organizations. . . or to forbid or restrain individual members 
of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate 
objects thereof; nor shall such organizations or the members 
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human labor is not a commodity or article of commerce and that 
the antitrust laws are not to be used to proscribe the lawful ac-
tivities of a union. Section 2()1° restricts the use of the injunction 
by federal courts in labor disputes and lists certain labor activi-
ties which are not to be held violative of any federal statute. 
The courts, however, continued to use the antitrust laws to 
contr.ol union activity;1l Congress responded with the Norris-La-
Guardia ActlJ in 1932. Declaring a public policy in favor of em-
ployee self-organization,·· Norris-LaGuardia further limits the 
federal judiciary's power to enjoin activities in labor disputes.·4 
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),II passed in 1935, es-
thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or con-
spiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws. 
15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976). 
20. Section 20 provides: 
No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any 
court of the United States ... in any case between an em-
ployer and employees . . . involving . . . a dispute concerning 
terms or conditions of employment, unless neceSBal'Y to pre-
vent ineparable injury to property or to a property right. . . . 
And no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit 
any person or persons, whether singly or in concert, from ter-
minating any relation of employment, or from ceasing to per-
form any work or labor, or from recommending, advising, or 
persuading others by peaceful means so to do ... or to em-
ploy any party to such dispute, or from recommending, advis-
ing, or persuading others by peaceful and lawful means so to 
do; 
. . . nor shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph 
be considered or held to be violations of any laws of the 
United States. 
29 U.s.C. I 52 (1976). 
21. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering. 254 U.S. 443 (1921) (no antitrust immu-
nity for union which departed from "legitimate" objectives). See also Coronado Coal v. 
United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925). 
22. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976). 
23. 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1976). Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I.R. Co., 
353 U.S. 30. 40 (1957) ("The Nonia-LaGuardia Act ... was designed primarily to pro-
tect working men in the exercise of organized, economic power, which is vital to all col-
lective bargaining."). 
24. Section 13(c) defines a labor dispute as "any controversy concerning terms or 
conditions of employment or concerning the association or representation of persons in 
negotiating. . . conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in 
the proximate relation of employer and employee. II 29 U.S.C. I 113(c) (1976). 
Section 4 provides in part: "No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to 
issue any ... injunction in any case growing out of any labor dispute .... " 29 U.S.C. 
• 104 (1976). 
25. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976). 
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tablished the national policy in favor of collective bargaining 
and set forth a statutory framework regulating the collective 
bargaining process. Thereafter, the Supreme Court was faced 
with the problem of resolving the fundamental conflict between 
the antitrust laws-designed to promote competition-and the 
labor laws-intended to promote unionization and collective 
bargaining, and to eliminate competition over wages and work-
ing conditions. II 
In Apex Hosiery v. Leader,1'1 the Supreme Court held the 
Sherman Act inapplicable to a union's strike. Although the 
strike did restrain trade, it did not have as its purpose the re-
duction of commercial competition in the product market. Ie The 
Court found that the Sherman Act did not prohibit the elimina-
tion of competition based on differing wages and working condi-
tions.1e The Court did not reach the question of whether the 
Clayton or Norris-LaGuardia Acts statutorily exempted the 
union's conduct.80 
The Court first recognized a specific statutory exemption for 
union activity in United States v. Hutcheson. 81 According to 
Hutcheson, the Norris-LaGuardia Act and section 20 of the 
Clayton Act, read together with the Sherman Act, determine 
what type of union conduct is exempt.1I AB long as "a union acts 
26. Allen Bradley Co. v. IBEW Local 3, 325 U.S. 797, 806 (1945). Comment, Anti-
trust Law in the Lobor-Management Context: The Employer 08 Defendant and the 
Union 08 Plaintiff, 32 BAYLOR L. REv. 385 (1980). 
27. 310 U.S. 469 (1940). 
28. Id. at 500-01. 
29. Id. at 503-04. 
30. One commentator noted that: 
[Justice) Stone was careful to say, however, that his test 
did not vary depending on the nature of the alleged wrong-
doer, whether union or management. The Apex Hosiery ap-
proach was not a matter of a statutory union exemption; the 
Sherman Act as written, would simply not apply to a certain 
class of restraints. Employers, or employers in combination 
with unions, would presumably be as free as unions acting 
alone to halt competition grounded in wage differentials. In 
short, the Sherman Act would be confined to restraints on the 
product market, and the labor market would be beyond its 
ken. 
St. Antoine, Connell: Antitrust Low at the Expense of Lobor Low, 62 VA. L. REV. 603, 
606 (1976) (footnotes omitted). 
31. 312 U.S. 219 (1941). 
32. Id. at 231. 
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in its self-interest and does not combine with non-labor groups" 
its activities are exempt from antitrust scrutiny." 
The Nonstatutory Exemption 
The statutory exemption is limited to unilateral union con-
duct.M The Court has utilized a nonstatutory balancing ap-
proach to decide if anticompetitive provisions in collective bar-
gaining agreements should be exempted. II The Court applied 
this nonstatutory balancing approach in Connell Construction 
Co. v. Plumbers Local 100,·' a case that figures prominently in 
California State Council. Local 100 had picketed Connell, a gen-
eral contractor, to force it to agree to subcontract its plumbing 
work only to subcontractors whose employees were represented 
by Local 100.17 Connell signed the agreement under protest and 
then sued to block its enforcement, claiming it violated the 
Sherman Act. The Supreme Court held that no labor exemption 
applied to Local 100's conduct and remanded for a determina-
tion as to whether the agreement in fact violated the Sherman 
Act.1S 
33. 1d. at 232. In Allen Bradley Co. v. IBEW Local 3, 325 U.S. 797 (1945), the Court 
denied the statutory exemption to a union which combined with employers in fixing 
markets and prices. The Court found that a union loses its statutory exemption if it 
combines with business in carrying out activities which, if conducted by the business 
alone, would violate the antitrust laWi. "We know that Congress feared the concentrated 
power of business organizations to dominate markets and prices. It intended to outlaw 
business monopolies. A business monopoly is no less such because a union participates, 
and such participation is a violation of the Act." 1d. at 811. See generally L. SULLIVAN, 
HANDBOOK or THE LAw or AlmTauST 724 (1977). 
34. Employer conduct may be exempted if it is specifically covered by statute. See 
§ 4(b) of the Norris·LaGuardia Act which exempts the act of becoming a member of an 
employer organization. 29 U.S.C. I 104 (1976). 
35. Meat Cutters and Butchers Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965); 
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). The Jewel Teo Court found 
that a collective bargaining agreemant is exempt if it is: (1) intimately related to wages, 
hOUlS or working conditions; (2) in the union's self interest; and (3) not intended to harm 
employers outside the collective bargaining relationship. When these conditions are met, 
the Court found national labor policy outweiahs the antitrust interest in promoting com· 
petition and the provision will be exempt. The Court held a provision in a collective 
bargaining agreement with a multi-employer group limiting marketing hours of grocery 
stores exempt since it fit all three criteria. In Pennington, the union was found to have 
forfeited its antitrust exemption when it "agreed with one set of employers to impose a 
certain wage scale on other bargaining units." 381 U.S. at 665. The provision was in-
tended to drive marginal coal operators out of business to the benefit of both the union 
and large coal operators. 
36. 421 U.S. 616 (1975). 
37. 1d. at 619-21. 
38. 1d. at 635, 637. 
6
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 11
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol12/iss1/11
1982] LABOR LAW 253 
Connell found labor's statutory exemption limited to unilat-
eral union action. all However, Connell explicitly acknowledged 
that a "limited nonstatutory exemption from antitrust sanc-
tions" existed to make a "proper accommodation between the 
Congressional policy favoring collective bargaining under the 
. NLRA and the congressional policy favoring free competition."·o 
"The nonstatutory exemption has its source in the strong labor 
policy favoring the association of employees to eliminate compe-
tition over wages and working conditions."u 
The Court held the ponstatutory exemption inapplicable to 
Local 100's agreement because the agreement neither resulted 
from collective bargaining nor limited itself to eliminating com-
petition over wages and working conditions.4I It was not a collec-
tive bargaining agreement since Local 100 did not represent 
Connell's employees.48 The agreement also restricted competi-
tion more than was necessary to simply eliminate differences in 
labor standards. The agreement required Connell to subcontract 
only to those firms which had signed collective bargaining agree-
ments with Local 100, rather than just to those firms which met 
union standards in wages and working conditions.·· 
The Connell Court also held that the NLRA does not pro-
vide the exclusive remedies for this type of conduct since "fed-
eral courts may decide labor law questions that emerge as collat-
eral issues in suits brought under independent federal remedies 
including the antitrust laws. "411 
39. Id. at 622·23. A union IOS88 the statutory exemption when it combines with a 
non·labor group-even in the context of collective bargaining. 
40. Id. at 622. 
41. Id. One commentator noted: 
Curiously, Justice Powell did not cite Apex Hosiery where 
the nonstatutory exemption apparently originated and where 
it received its fullest explication. Perhaps Justice Powell 
wished to limit the nonstatutory exemption to situations in· 
volving union activity, rather than embrace Justice Stone's 
more expansive concept that the Sherman Act simply does not 
reach a certain class of labor market restraints whether im· 
posed by labor or management. 
St. Antoine, supra note 30, at 618 n.64. 
42. 421 U.S. at 622. 
43. Id. at 619. 
44. Id. at 620. 
45. Id. at 626 (footnote omitted). One commentator argued that Connell's holding 
that the remedies provided in the labor statutes were not exclusive would make it much 
7
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Connell's significance is twofold. First, it explicitly recog-
nizes a non-statutory exemption from the antitrust laws for col-
lective bargaining over wages and working conditions.·e Second, 
it does not limit the remedies available to unions and employers 
to those provided in the labor statutes but instead allows suits 
under other appropriate statutes including the antitrust laws.·' 
The Labor Exemption Applied to Employer Conduct 
The Ninth Circuit in California State Council faced the is-
sue of when employer conduct should be exempted from the an-
titrust laws. 
The Supreme Court held, in Anderson v. Shipowners Asso-
ciation,48 that an employer combination directed against em-
ployees can violate the antitrust laws. The Court found an al-
leged employer conspiracy to control employment practices 
through the use of a hiring registry potentially violated the 
Sherman Act because it restrained competition among employ-
ers in their employment practices.·' 
In Cordova v. Bache & CO.,IO the New York district court 
applied the antitrust laws to an alleged employer conspiracy di-
rected against employees although the conspiracy did not other-
wise affect commercial competition. III The court found an al-
leged conspiracy among stock brokerage firms to reduce the 
commissions paid to stockbrokers violates the antitrust laws in 
the same manner as a price-fixing agreement. III Section 6 of the 
Clayton Actll8 did not exempt the employer conspiracy because 
section 6 "was aimed at preserving labor's right to organize, not 
easier for unions to sue employers for antitrust violations. Goldberg, Antitrust: The 
Union as Plaintiff, SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS, PRO-
CBBDINGS 0' THE 26TH ANNUAL INSTIT\ITB ON LABOR LAw, 175, 177-82 (1980). 
46. This distinction between statutory and non-statutory exemptions was described 
as "unfortunate" by two commentators who found all labor exemptions to be derived 
from statutes and felt the distinction could lead to mischievous results. 1 P. ARBBDA & D. 
TuRNER, ANTITRUST LAW 191-93 (1978). 
47. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 33, at 729-31. 
48. 272 U.S. 359 (1926). 
49. 1d. at 363. 
50. 321 F. Supp. 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
51. 1d. at 606. 
52.1d. 
53. Section 6 provides: "The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of 
commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976). 
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that of capital. "114 The court found that only in the context of 
collective bargaining, or actions reasonably related to the collec-
tive bargaining process, are multi-employer combinations prop-
erly shielded from antitrust scrutiny. II 
This exemption for collective bargaining extends beyond the 
contract itself. In Clune v. Publishers' Association of New York 
City," a multi-employer group's lockout in response to a whip-
saw strike was seen as reasonably incident to the collective bar-
gaining process and thus immune from the antitrust laws." The 
court interpreted the LaGuardia Act and section 20 of the Clay-
ton Actll8 as shielding the employer lockout from the antitrust 
laws.lIs 
The Clune court alternatively found no Sherman Act viola-
tion because the employer agreement did not restrain commer-
cial competion.so For the same reason, other courts have held 
that the use of strike insurance by an employer groupS 1 or the 
refusal to bargain with a unionS. does not violate the Sherman 
Act. sa Rather than interpreting federal labor policy as exempting 
the employer conduct, these courts have followed the approach 
54. 321 F. Supp. at 607. The court argued that had Congress intended to exempt 
employer conduct as well it could have "provided that compensation offered or paid by 
employers to employees is not a commodity or article of commerce. This it did not do." 
Id. at 606. The court discussed in detail the purposes and legislative history of the Clay-
ton Act. 
55. Id. at 607. See also Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 
1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. SOl (1977); Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 
F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The Mackey court found no labor exemption for employ-
ers except in the context of collective bargaining and then only if the collective bargain-
ing agreement provision restrains competition primarily among the parties to the agree-
ment. According to Robertson, the statutory labor exemption applies only to union 
activities and the nonstatutory labor exemption applies to employers only in connection 
with collective bargaining agreements. But see Clothing and Textile Workers v. J.P. Ste-
vens & Co., 475 F. Supp. 482 (S.D. N.Y. 1979), vacated 08 moot, 638 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 
19SO), discussed in text accompanying notes 66 and 67 infra. 
56. 214 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y.), alf'd per curiam, 314 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1963). 
57. Id. at 524. 
58. Section 20 of the Clayton Act proscribes injunctions against any person for 
"ceasing ... to employ any party ... to [a labor) dispute." 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1976). 
59. 214 F. Supp. at 528-29. 
60. Id. at 524-25. 
61. Kennedy v. Long Island R.R. Co., 319 F.2d 366, 373 (2d Cir. 1973). 
62. Prepmore Apparel, Inc. v. Clothing Workers, 431 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1970). 
63. See also Schatte v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 182 
F.2d 158 (9th Cir. 1950) (alleged conspiracy to force other employers to hire members of 
a rival union did not violate the Sherman Act). 
9
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suggested in Apex Hosiery that the Sherman Act simply does 
not reach the labor market.et This idea of a labor market per se 
immunity8& can lead to erroneous results if applied to employer 
conduct outside the collective bargaining process. 
In Clothing and Textile Workers v. J.P. Stevens & Co.,e8 
the court held an alleged employer conspiracy to fix wages as 
part of an anti-union campaign not violative of the antitrust 
laws because it only restrained competition in the labor market 
and not in the product market.87 This holding was in error. The 
Supreme Court made it clear in Anderson that the antitrust 
laws apply to employer conspiracies restraining competition in 
the labor market as well as in the product market." 
A better approach than the mechanical labor market per se 
test is to balance the policies involved.88 To determine whether 
employer conduct is exempt, the degree of interference with fed-
erallabor law policy that would result if the antitrust claim were 
allowed is balanced against the magnitude of the restraint of 
trade and whether competition is interfered with directly or in-
directly.70 Under this approach, employer combinations are im-
mune from antitrust scrutiny if they have no anticompetitive ef-
fect unrelated to collective bargaining.71 But employers who 
combine to restrict competition in the labor market outside the 
collective bargaining process should be found liable under the 
antitrust laws since protecting this conduct does not further fed-
eral labor law policies and frustrates the antitrust policy of pro-
moting competition. 
64. 310 U.S. 469 (1940). But see id. at 487. 
65. "No one seriously suggests that antitrust policy should be concerned with the 
labor market per se." Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary Analysis, 104 
U. PA. L. REV., 252, 254 (1955). See also Comment, supra note 26, suggesting that the 
courts have created a quasi-statutory exemption for employers. 
66. 475 F. Supp. 482 (S.D. N.Y. 1979), vacated as moot, 638 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1980). 
67. Id. at 488-90. See Carroll v. Protection Maritime Ins. Co., 512 F.2d 4, 9 (1st Cir. 
1975) (antitrust laws do not apply to conspiracies aimed at labor market); National Con-
structors Aas'n v. National Electrical Contractors, 498 F. Supp. 510, 532 (D.C. Md. 1980) 
(dictum) (labor market excluded from antitrust regulation altogether). 
68. 272 U.S. at 363. 
69. Meat Cutters Local 15i6 v. Wetterau Foods, 597 F.2d 133 (8th Cir. 1979). 
70. Id. at 136. 
71. Id. The court held a retail grocery store's use of strikebreaking employees loaned 
by a wholesale food supplier exempt from antitrust sanctions because it had no effect on 
competition outside the collective bargaining negotiations. 
10
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Standing 
The Ninth Circuit panel also had to determine whether the 
union had the requisite standing to bring an antitrust action. 
Section 4 of the Clayton Act states that anyone who is "injured 
in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in 
the antitrust laws" may sue for treble damages.71 
The courts, fearing endless litigation and unreasonable 
damage awards if section 4 was read literally, have developed 
various standing tests to limit who can bring antitrust suits." 
The Ninth Circuit uses the "target area" test to determine 
standing.74 A plaintiff in this circuit may sue if he is within that 
area of the economy threatened by a "breakdown of competitive 
conditions" as a result of the antitrust violation.'11 A plaintiff has 
standing if his injury was foreseeable.'" 
Unions generally have standing if they are the intended vic-
tims of a conspiracy to restrain trade." Unions also have a suffi-
72. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). 
73. Courts have followed either the "direct injury," "target area" or "zone of inter-
ests" test. The most conservative is the direct injury test which requires an immediate 
connection between the plaintiff and the antitrust violator. Standing is denied if an in-
termediate victim stands between the parties. Nationwide Auto Appraiser Serv., Inc. v. 
Association of Cas. & Sur. Cos., 382 F.2d 925 (lOth Cir. 1967) (franchisor denied stand-
ing); Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910) (shareholder denied stand-
ing). The zone of interests test is the most liberal. Followed in the Third and Sixth 
Circuits, this approach requires that each case be analyzed individually. U[TJhe nature of 
the industry in which the alleged antitrust violation exists, the relationship of the plain-
tiff to the alleged violator, and the alleged effect of the antitrust violation upon the 
plaintiff" are all considered in determining whether allowing the particular plaintiff to 
bring suit will effectuate .. 'the fundamental purpose of the antitrust laws.' " Cromar Co. 
v. Nuclear Materials & Equip. Corp., 543 F.2d 501, 506 (3d Cir. 1967) (quoting In re 
Multidistrict Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 125 (9th Cir. 1973)). Accord, Bravman v. Bas-
sett Furniture Indus., Inc., 552 F.2d 90, 99 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977); 
Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975). See generally, 2 P. ARODA 
& D. TURNER, supra note 46, at 160-62. 
74. Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 365 (9th Cir. 1955). 
75. Conference of Studio Unions v. Lowe's Inc., 198 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951), 
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952). See also Contreras v. Grower Shipper Vegetable Ass'n 
of Cent. Cal., 484 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir. 1973) (farmworkers denied standing to sue growers 
because they were only incidental victims of alleged price fixing scheme); accord, Gutier-
rez v. E. & J. Gallo Winery Co., 604 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1979). 
76. In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 199 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. 
denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974). 
77. Tugboat, Inc. v. Mobile Towing Co., 534 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1976); International 
Ass'n of Heat and Frost Insulators v. United Contractors Ass'n, 483 F.2d 384 (3d Cir. 
1973). 
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cient business interest in organizing and representing employees 
to meet the Clayton Act's requirement of an injury to the pri-
vate litigant's "business or property. "'78 
C. COURT's ANALYSIS 
The Sherman Act Claim 
The panel held that the union had properly alleged a viola-
tion of the Sherman Act.79 The AGCC's alleged conspiracy with 
landowners and others to boycott unionized subcontractors and 
hire only non unionized subcontractors potentially violated the 
Sherman Act's prohibition against restraints on commercial 
competition.80 The panel found the union's allegations presented 
"the obverse of the situation described in Connell."8l The 
AGCC's alleged conduct would have the effect of restraining 
competition among subcontractors and excluding unionized sub-
contractors from receiving bids even if they were more efficient 
than their non unionized counterparts. Because the Supreme 
Court in Connell had found such conduct on the part of a union 
could violate the Sherman Act, the Ninth Circuit panel held 
that the AGCC's alleged conduct could also form the basis for an 
antitrust claim unless otherwise exempted.8I The fact that the 
AGCC's alleged conduct might also violate the National Labor 
Relations Act did not preclude an antitrust suit.8 ' 
The Statutory Exemption 
The panel next examined the Clayton and Norris-LaGuar-
dia Acts to determine if they could be construed as exempting 
the alleged employer conduct. Section 20 of the Clayton Act ex-
empts from antitrust scrutiny anyone who, in the course of a 
dispute over conditions of employment, ceases to employ an-
other party or recommends that others do SO.84 The panel stated 
78. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). See Tugboat, Inc. v. Mobile Towing Co., 534 F.2d 1172, 
1176 (5th Cir. 1976); International Ass'n of Heat and Frost Insulators v. United Contrac-
tors Ass'n, 483 F.2d 384, 394 (3d Cir. 1973). 
79. 648 F.2d at 532. 
SO. ld. at 531. 
81. ld. at 532. 
82.ld. 
83. ld. n.6. 
84. 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1976). Section 20 of the Clayton Act does not define the phrase 
"dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment." Therefore, the definition of 
"labor dispute" found in § 13(c) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1976), 
12
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that section 20 could conceivably be interpreted as exempting 
the AGCC's alleged conduct. Under this view, the AGCC could 
be seen as simply recommending to others in the course of a 
labor dispute not to hire unionized subcontractors." 
However, the panel found that to interpret section 20 of the 
Clayton Act as exempting antiunion conduct by employers 
"would be totally inconsistent with the pro-labor purpose for 
which section 20 was enacted."88 Section 20 was enacted prima-
rily to protect unions from antitrust scrutiny.8'7 However, unions 
can lose this exemption if they combine with business in an-
ticompetitive conduct. Therefore, the panel found that "if the 
statutory exemption is inapplicable to business group conspira-
cies involving unions, the exemption cannot be read to immunize 
anticompetitive conduct on the part of employers acting 
alone."88 
According to the panel, the Clayton Act's exemptions were 
rendered superfluous by the broader exemptions of Norris-La-
Guardia.8e Since the AGCC's conduct did not fall within any of 
the situations listed in Norris-LaGuardia, it could not be statu-
torily exempted from the antitrust laws.eo 
The panel concluded that it would be contrary to the pur-
poses of the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts to exempt from 
the antitrust laws an employer conspiracy to boycott unionized 
subcontractors.81 
has been incorporated into § 20. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 231 (1941). 
The panel determined that the AGCC's conspiracy could arguably be seen as arising in 
the course of a labor dispute since it involved "terms or conditions of employment" or 
"the association or representation of persons" regarding employment. 648 F.2d at 534. 
85. 648 F.2d at 533-34. 
86. [d. at 533. 
87. [d. at 533-36. 
88. [d. at 534. 
89. [d. at 534-35. 
90. [d. at 535. Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides that no injunction 
shall issue in any labor dispute to prohibit any person from (a) ceasing to work or remain 
in any relation of employment, (b) becoming a member of any labor or employer organi-
zation, (c) paying or ceasing to pay benefits to anyone involved in a labor dispute, (d) 
aiding a person involved in a labor law suit, (3) publicizing a labor dispute, (0 peaceably 
assembling or (g) advising or agreeing with another person to do or not do any of the acts 
specified above. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976). 
91. 648 F.2d at 536. 
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The Nonstatutory Exemption 
The panel explained that Connell82 had made clear that the 
nonstatutory exemption could apply only to cases concerning 
collective bargaining agreements between unions and employers 
on wages and working conditions. Because the AGCC's alleged 
conduct neither involved a collective bargaining agreement nor 
confined itself to wages or working conditions, the nonstatutory 
exemption could not apply.'s 
Standing 
The panel stated that, to have standing to sue under section 
4 of the Clayton Act, a private antitrust litigant must show the 
injury was both factually and legally caused by the antitrust vio-
lation." The union met the factual causation requirement by al-
leging that the AGCC's conspiracy caused injury to its business 
interests in organizing employees, negotiating collective bargain-
ing agreements and securing jobs for its members.,a 
The legal causation requirement limits standing to those 
whose injury is "of the type that the antitrust laws [are] in-
tended to prevent.''" The panel applied the target area test for 
legal causation and held the union's allegations met that re-
quirement as well." Not only was it foreseeable to the AGCC 
that the union would be damaged by its boycott of unionized 
subcontractors, that was the intended result. Because the union 
was "not only hit, but was aimed at,"'s the target area test was 
met." 
92. 421 U.S. 616 (1975). For a discU88ion of Connell, see notes 36-47 supra and ac-
companying text. 
93. 648 F.2d at 536. 
94. 1d. at 536·37. 
95. Id. at 537. 
96.ld. 
97. Id. at 538. 
98. 1d. at 537 (quoting Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 365 (9th 
Cir. 1955». 
99. The court stated in dictum that it might in the future use the more liberal zone 
of interests test for standing to better effectuate the policies of allowing a compensatory 
remedy to those harmed by antitrust violators and providing better enforcement of the 
antitrust laws by private parties. 648 F.2d at 538 n.18. 
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The Dissent 
The dissent agreed with the district court's characterization 
of the complaint and insisted that this was properly a labor, not 
an antitrust case.100 The district court had found that the plain-
tiffs actually alleged defendants violated the antitrust laws by 
refusing to deal only with unionized subcontractors.10l The dis-
sent stated that to allow this lawsuit would permit the union to 
achieve exactly what Connell sought to prohibit. Nonunionized 
subcontractors would be excluded from the market because gen-
eral contractors would fear antitrust litigation if they dealt with 
anyone other than subcontractors who had signed collective bar-
gaining agreements with the plaintiffs. lOS 
The dissent argued that even if the district court's charac-
terization of the complaint was too narrow, the union still had 
no antitrust claim because there was no restraint upon commer-
cial competition in the marketing of goods or services. Injury to 
a union's organizational and representational efforts without 
more did not state a claim under the antitrust laws, but instead 
fell under the terms of the National Labor Relations Act.loa 
According to the dissent, the majority had tried to fit the 
complaint under the Sherman Act by finding an alleged injury 
to two groups of employers. First were those employers who 
would otherwise have entered into a collective bargaining agree-
ment with the plaintiffs but for the conspiracy. The dissent ar-
gued there was no injury at all to these employers because they 
could make more profit by remaining non unionized. Thus there 
was no restraint in commercial competition in violation of the 
antitrust laws and the union's only remedy lay under the labor 
laws.1M 
As to the second group of employers, those who were al-
ready unionized and were being denied contracts because of the 
alleged injury, a significant injury was cognizable under the anti-
trust laws. But this raised a standing problem. The dissent ar-
gued that the target area test should only give standing to those 
100. Id. at 543. 
101. 404 F. Supp. at 1070. 
102. 648 F.2d at 541. 
103. Id. at 541·42. 
104. Id. at 542. 
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directly harmed by the alleged boycott and not to the employees 
of the victim as well. 1011 
The dissent concluded that even if the union had standing, 
this still was "a labor case wearing an antitrust costume .... It 
should remain a labor case. "106 
The Modified Opinion 
The AGCC's petition for a hearing and suggestion for a re-
hearing en banc was denied. In response to the AGCC's sugges-
tion that the panel's opinion "could be read as disapproving 
multi-employer bargaining entirely,"107 the panel clarified its 
original opinion. 
The panel noted that multi-employer bargaining had been 
sanctioned by both the National Labor Relations Board and the 
Supreme Court. 1 011 Further, the union had alleged injury not 
from the formation of a multi-employer group but from the 
AGCC's group boycott. 1" 
The panel stated that only employer agreements with an 
anticompetitive purpose or effect violate the Sherman Act. 
Multi-employer unit bargaining with a union to eliminate com-
petition over wages and working conditions cannot give rise to 
an antitrust claim. no And, even if the Sherman Act covered 
multi-employer bargaining units, section 4 of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act,111 read together with section 20 of the Clayton 
105. [d. at 543. 
106. [d. The court in Carpenters Local 1846 v. Pratt-Farmsworth, 511 F. Supp. 509, 
521 (E.D. La. 1981), found the dissent's opinion in California State Council "enlighten-
ing." The Pratt-Farmsworth court dismissed a union's complaint that an employer had 
violated the antitrust laws by setting up an alter ego corporation to avoid dealing with 
the union. The court found that an employer conspiracy to impair a union's representa-
tional efforts could only be remedied under the labor laws since it did not restrain com-
mercial competition. It agreed with the dissent in California State Council that the anti-
trust laws should not be applied to employer conspiracies aimed at unions. 
107. 648 F.2d at 543. 
108. [d. at 543-44. Multi-employer bargaining units can only be formed if the em-
ployers agree to it, the union consents and the NLRB approves. 18-C T. KHEEL, BUSI-
NESS ORGANIZATIONS, LABOR LAW § 14.03(4)(b) (1979). 
109. 648 F.2d at 544. 
110. [d. 
Ill. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976). 
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Act,112 clearly exempts from the antitrust laws the act of 
"[b]ecoming or remaining a member ... of an employer 
organization. "118 
The panel concluded that an employer agreement violates 
the Sherman Act only if it has "an anti competitive purpose or 
effect on some aspect of competition other than competition 
over wages or working conditions."114 
The dissent criticized the majority's additional OpIniOn, 
finding it did nothing to clarify what conduct by a multi-em-
ployer bargaining unit would violate the Sherman Act. The dis-
sent thought the majority erred in allowing the antitrust laws to 
intrude into labor relations rather than confining the remedies 
to those provided in the labor laws.1lI 
D. CRITIQUE 
The result reached in California State Council seems cor-
rect. The district court mischaracterized the complaint by stat-
ing that the union was suing AGCC for refusing to deal exclu-
sively with subcontractors which were signatories to contracts 
with the union.118 The Ninth Circuit correctly characterized the 
complaint as alleging that the AGCC and its members had con-
spired with other employers and with each other to subcontract 
only with nonunion subcontractors.l17 If at trial the union can-
not prove a group boycott of unionized subcontractors, its claim 
will fail on the merits. However, it would be improper to dismiss 
the complaint at the pleading stage by construing it too 
narrowly.lls 
The majority also correctly held that the union's allegations 
stated a claim under the Sherman Act. The alleged conspiracy 
restrained commercial competition by excluding unionized sub-
contractors from the market. They would be excluded from con-
112. [d. § 52. 
113. [d. § 104(b). 
114. 648 F.2d at 544. 
115. [d. at 545. The dissent listed a number of scenarios which he thought might 
subject multi-employer groups to antitrust liability as a result of the majority's opinion. 
See text accompanying note 125 infra for one scenario discussed by the dissent. 
116. 404 F. Supp. at 1070. 
117. 648 F.2d at 531. 
118. Walling v. Beverly Enterprises, 476 F.2d 393 (9th Cir. 1973). 
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tracts not because they were necessarily less efficient but be-
cause they were unionized. Connell had found that this type of 
restraint on competition could form the basis for an antitrust 
claim. 111 The purpose of the antitrust laws is to outlaw all con-
spiracies that unreasonably restrain commercial competition, re-
gardless of motive. ISO A group boycott which has as its ultimate 
goal the weakening of a union is nevertheless covered by the an-
titrust laws if it restrains commercial competition. The district 
court stated that an antitrust cause of action alleged by a union 
against an employer in the normal type of labor dispute could 
not be recognized.1I1 It erroneously determined that, in the la-
bor-management context, the antitrust laws apply only to agree-
ments between unions and employers which affect commercial 
competition among third parties. III Simply because the cases de-
cided by the Supreme Court have involved union agreements 
with employers· that affected competition among third parties11a 
should not be interpreted to mean that employer combinations 
that are directed against unions and also affect commercial com-
petition are somehow exempt. Employer combinations enjoy an 
immunity from the antitrust laws only when they are part of the 
collective bargaining process. But this was not an instance of 
employers combining as part of that process to counter a union's 
whipsaw strike or other pressure tactic. m The AGCC's alleged 
conspiracy arose outside the collective bargaining process and 
affected commerce among third parties, i.e., the subcontractors. 
It could not be held immune from antitrust coverage simply be-
cause it arose in the labor-management context. To hold other-
wise would allow employers to freely restrict commercial compe-
tition among themselves or others as long as their ultimate 
motive was to injure the union. 
The majority's holding that the alleged employer conspiracy 
potentially violated the Sherman Act will not lead to multi-em-
119. 421 U.S. at 635. 
120. Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). 
121. 404 F. Supp. at 1070. 
122. Id. at 1070-71. 
123. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Loca1 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975); Meat Cutters 
and Butchers Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965); United Mine Workers v. 
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Allen Bradley Co. v. IBEW Loca1 3, 325 U.S. 797 
(1945). 
124. See, e.g., Clune v. Publishers' Ass'n of New York City, 214 F. Supp. 520 
(S.D.N.Y. 1963). 
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ployer groups being unduly restricted in their choice of bargain-
ing tactics, as the dissent feared. The dissent questioned 
whether a multi-employer unit's decision to bargain aggressively 
with a weak union in order to provoke a strike and ultimately 
cause the union to lose its representative status through loss of 
employee support could result in antitrust liability for the em-
ployers.1211 It clearly would not for the same reason that em-
ployer agreements to purchase strike insurance or engage in a 
lockout are not covered. Such employer agreements are immune 
from the antitrust laws because they are part of the collective 
bargaining process and do not affect outside parties. lie Only 
multi-employer agreements that are made outside the collective 
bargaining process or unduly affect third parties are subject to 
antitrust sanctions. 
The panel also correctly determined that labor's statutory 
exemption did not protect the AGCC's alleged conduct. The 
Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts were passed primarily to 
benefit labor; any language found in them arguably exempting 
employer conduct should be narrowly construed. 
While the result reached by the panel on the statutory labor 
exemption is correct, its analysis is questionable in part. The 
panel first found that the alleged employer conduct arguably fell 
within the language of section 20 of the Clayton Act which ex-
empts from antitrust liability a recommendation by one person 
to another to cease to employ any other party.U17 Because the 
exemptions in the Norris-LaGuardia Act are broader than those 
in the Clayton Act, the panel found the Clayton Act's exemp-
tions superfluous; thus only the language of Norris-LaGuardia 
need be examined. U8 The panel then concluded that the AGCC's 
conduct was not statutorily exempt because none of Norris-La-
Guardia's exempt categories applied.111I It is an odd result to 
state that Norris-LaGuardia is broader than the Clayton Act but 
then find that Norris-LaGuardia does not exempt conduct which 
125. 648 F.2d at 545. 
126. See Plumbers Local 598 v. Morris, 511 F. Supp. 1298 (E.n. Wash. 1981) hold-
ing that an employer lockout is not subject to the antitrust law8. It distinguished Califor-
nia State Council on its facts. [d. at 1311-12. 
127. 648 F.2d at 533-34. 
128. [d. at 534-35. 
129. [d. at 535. 
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the Clayton Act arguably does. Furthermore, Norris-LaGuardia 
provides that no injunction shall issue to prohibit any person 
from "ceasing ... to remain in any relation of employment ... 
or advising, urging or otherwise causing or inducing" anyone else 
to do SO.180 This language seems as broad as that in the Clayton 
Act. While the court properly concluded that in light of the pur-
pose of this statute this exemption could not apply to the 
AGCC's alleged conduct, it was improper to read the Norris-La-
Guardia Act as exempting less than the Clayton Act. 
The court correctly found that the union had standing to 
bring the claim. A union's business is organizing and represent-
ing employees. It should be able to sue under the Clayton Act to 
protect this interest just as any other business can sue to protect 
its interests when endangered by a conspiracy violating the anti-
trust laws. Because the union was the intended victim, it clearly 
fell within the target area of the employers' alleged conspiracy. 
Congress created a private antitrust damage remedy to better 
compensate the antitrust victim and provide better enforcement 
against antitrust violators. 111 To deny standing to the intended 
victim of an antitrust conspiracy would frustrate both of these 
goals. 
E. IMPACT 
California State Council establishes that the Ninth Circuit 
will not recognize any !Clabor market per se" exe.mption to the 
antitrust laws if an employer combination made outside the col-
lective bargaining process aft'ects commercial competition among 
third parties. The Ninth Circuit will hold such a combination 
potentially liable to antitrust sanctions unless either the Clayton 
or Norris-LaGuardia Acts clearly exempts the conduct or unless 
it is a necessary part of collective bargaining over wages or work-
ing conditions. 
However, it is not clear how the Ninth Circuit would rule in 
a case such as Clothing and Textile Workers v. J.P. Stevens & 
. Co.,18lI where the alleged employer combination restrained com-
130. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976). 
131. Berger & Berstein, An Analytical Framework for Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE 
L.J. 809, 845·58 (1977). 
132. 475 F. Supp. 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
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petition over wages but did not otherwise affect third parties. 
Such a combination directly restrains competition among em-
ployers and should be held to violate the antitrust laws. ISS To 
exempt such conduct frustrates the antitrust laws' purpose of 
promoting competition and contravenes the labor law policies of 
protecting employee self-organizing and promoting collective 
bargaining. 
However, the Ninth Circuit might find that the antitrust 
laws do not apply to such employer combinations because they 
do not affect competition among third parties: "[A]n employer 
agreement falls within the prohibitions of the Sherman Act only 
if it has an anti competitive purpose or effect on some aspect of 
competition other than competition over wages or working con-
ditions. "134 This statement was made in the context of a discus-
sion of antitrust liability for multi-employer bargaining units 
which were consented to by a union and approved by the NLRB. 
But, standing alone, it could be interpreted as exempting all em-
ployer agreements regarding wages or working conditions re-
gardless of whether they arise in a collective bargaining context. 
This would lead to an anomalous result: A union could bring 
antitrust claims against employers only when they conspire to 
injure the union indirectly by restraining competition among 
third parties; such claims would be barred against employers 
who agree, outside the collective bargaining process, to restrain 
competition over wages or working conditions and thereby injure 
the union directly. 
Employer immunity to antitrust sanctions is properly lim-
ited to the exceptions spelled out in the Clayton and Norris-La-
Guardia Acts and actions which relate to the collective bargain-
ing process. All other employer restraints on competition in the 
labor market should be found potentially violative of the anti-
trust laws. 
Richard Slizeski 
133. Anderson v. Shipowners Ass'n, 272 U.S. 359, 364 (1926); Cordova v. Bache & 
Co., 321 F. Supp. 600, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
134. 648 F.2d at 544. 
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II. NO DEFERRAL TO ARBITRATOR AWARDS IN SEC-
TION 8(a)(3) CASES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In NLRB v. Max Factor and CO., l the Ninth Circuit re-
viewed the application of the Spielberg doctrine· favoring defer-
ral by the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) to arbi-
trators' awards in cases involving charges of unfair labor 
practices.8 The court held that the Board had discretion to re-
fuse deferral to an arbitrator's award which had denied rein-
statement of ~ discharged union steward,· and affirmed the 
Board's order of reinstatement. II Substantial evidence supported 
the Board's finding that the employer discharged its employee 
primarily because of her union activities,' and that the em-
ployee's conduct was not so flagrantly improper as to deprive 
her of protection under the National Labor Relations Act (the 
Act).' Allegations of discord between the employer and the em-
ployee did not overcome the Board's discretion to order 
reinstatement.' 
1. 640 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Schwarzer, D.J. sitting by designation; the other 
panel members were Goodwin and Pregerson, J.J.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2314 (1981). 
2. The doctrine draws its name from the Board decision in Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 
N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). For a discU88ion of the doctrine, see notea 31 and 37 infra and 
accompanying text. 
3. National Labor Relations Act § 7 reads in part: "Employees shall have the right 
to self.organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizationa, to bargain collectively 
through reprel!8ntatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities 
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . ." 29 
U.S.C. § 157 (1976). 
National Labor Relations Act §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3), provide in part: 
It shall be an unfair labor practice ror an employer-
(1) to interrere with, restrain, or coerce employees 
in the exercise or the rights guaranteed in section 157 or 
this title; 
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure or 
employment or any term or condition of employment to 
encourage or discourage membership in any labor or· 
ganization . . . . 
29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(l) and 158(a)(3) (1976). 
4. 640 F.2d at 203. 
5. rd. at 205. 
6. rd. at 204. 
7. rd. at 205. 
8. rd. 
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In Max Factor, the Ninth Circuit has apparently declined 
the invitation implicit in Douglas Aircraft Co. v. NLRB' to ex-
tend the Spielberg doctrine into areas of arguably unprotected 
employee activity. 
B. FACTS OF THE CASE 
Luisa Gratz was the chief union steward10 for production 
employees in Max Factor's Los Angeles plant. In late 1976 and 
early 1977, she became embroiled in a series of conflicts with 
management related to her conduct of union business on com-
pany time. Finally, after an explosive confrontation with Max 
Factor's Personnel Manager, Gratz was discharged,l1 allegedly 
9. 609 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1979). The court, in Doug/as Aircraft Co., ordered the 
Board to defer to the arbitrator's award. For further discussion of the implications of 
Douglas Aircraft see notes 65-70 infra and accompanying text. 
10. Employees were represented by Warehouse, Processing and Distribution Work-
ers Union, Local 26, International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union. Max Fac-
tor & Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 804, 805 (1978). 
11. Gratz's discharge was not a sudden, isolated event but the final act in a series of 
incidents, which showed a severe deterioration in the working relationship between 
Gratz, representing the union, and company management-specifically Bill Piercy, Di-
rector of Industrial Relations, and James Bryant, Personnel Manager. A brief list of the 
more unpleasant disputes between Gratz and Bryant and/or Piercy during the six month 
period prior to Gratz's discharge illustrates the extent of conflict. 
On August 11, 1976, Gratz called Bryant a "racist" in front of other employees dur-
ing a discussion about the promotion of a black employee. John Lee, the union business 
representative, later reprimanded Gratz. On November 10, Bryant had a heated discus-
sion with Gratz in the company cafeteria, accusing her of upsetting the company nurse 
80 severely that the nurse experienced a heart attack. Gratz filed a grievance against 
Bryant, and Bryant later apologized. Piercy sent Gratz a warning letter on December 9, 
advising her that she was devoting too much time on the job to chief steward duties and 
not enough on production work. 
During the morning of December 27, Bryant refused to give Gratz information rela-
tive to a pending arbitration matter even though the company had previously agreed to 
furnish this material. Two hours later, Bryant issued Gratz an "Employee Warning No-
tice," signed by Piercy, again indicating Gratz was spending too little time on production 
work. Gratz refused to sign the warning as requested and called Bryant a "big phoney" 
and a "little twerp." At 4 p.m. the same day, Gratz was given another "Employee Warn-
ing Notice" signed by Bryant informing her she was suspended for "violation of plant 
rule #39-uwe [sic) of profane and abusive language." The following day, December 28, 
the union filed a grievance against the company .. 
On February 1, 1977, Gratz and Bryant disagreed on the amount of time Gratz could 
take to discuss pending grievances with another union steward during working hours. At 
the end of her shift, Gratz remained in the plant cafeteria eating with several employees. 
Bryant observed this on his way out of the building. The following day, February 2, 
Bryant and Gratz had an explosive confrontation. Bryant accused Gratz of conducting 
an illegal union meeting the previous evening. The problem about the pending grievances 
was again brought up. During the conversation, Gratz called Bryant a "liar." On Febru-
ary 3, Bryant discharged Gratz. Max Factor & Co., 239 N.L.R.B. at 807-13. 
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for use of abusive language, insubordination and lack of produc-
tion.1I Gratz immediately filed unfair labor practice charges 
against Max Factor with the Board.18 
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that the 
reasons given by Max Factor for Gratz's discharge were actually 
pretextual; the real motive was Gratz's pursuit of protected ac-
tivities as chief steward.14 He further found that Max Factor vi-
olated section 8(a)(1) of the ActlD when it offered Gratz eco-
nomic benefits if she would give up her union involvement. III 
The ALJ also determined that Gratz's abusive conduct in the 
course of her duties was not so flagrant as to forfeit the protec-
tion of the Act.n The Board subsequently adopted the findings 
of the ALJ and ordered reinstatement and back pay.lS 
Shortly after Gratz filed the unfair labor practice charges, 
the union grieved the discharge under the contract, and took its 
protest to arbitration. Ii The arbitrator issued an opinion and 
award while the findings of the ALJ were pending on exceptions 
12. According to the "Employee Warning Notice," Gratz was discharged "for viola-
tion of plant rule 39 (uwe [sic] of abusive language) plant rule 19 (insubordination) and 
failure to perform a reasonable amount of work." Max Factor & Co., 239 N.L.R.B. at 813. 
13. [d. 
14. The ALI said the reasons given by Max Factor were 
[d. at 818. 
[N)ot the real reason for Gratz' [sic] discharge but was a pre-
text used to cloak a discriminatory motive, hence, the dis-
charge violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Assuming 
that I have erred in evaluating the record in this respect. . ., 
I would still be constrained to conclude that Gratz' (sic) dis-
charge violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 
15. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l) (1976). 
16. The offer of economic benefits took place during October or November 1976 and 
·occurred during a conversation between Gratz, Piercy and Bryant. According to Gratz's 
testimony before the ALJ, Piercy asked if she would consider working for the company 
in a management position or returning to law school if Max Factor paid her expenses. 
Gratz refused both suggestions. Max Factor & Co., 239 N.L.R.B. at 814. 
17. The ALI found Gratz's conduct to be spontaneous, and not a product of a con-
scious decision to undermine management's authority. Also, the conduct took place while 
Gratz was engaged in protected activity, i.e., her duties as union steward. [d. at 819. 
18. [d. at 820. 
19. Normally, the grievance procedure delineated in the collective bargaining agree-
ment would require that the grievance be settled at one of three levels with the company 
organization in discussions between the grievant and the foreman (step I), the grievant's 
steward and the personnel manager (step 2), or the Union's grievance committee and the 
Company's Director of Industrial Relations (step 3). If the dispute was not resolved by 
the weekly "third step" meeting. step 4 provided for binding arbitration. [d. at 806. 
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before the Board.20 The arbitrator found in favor of the com-
pany because Gratz's conduct and abusive language constituted 
just cause for discipline and Gratz herself had contributed un-
necessarily to the conflicts with management by her unjustified 
and superior attitude.21 In addition, the testimony of other chief 
stewards as to the amount of time they used for union activities 
convinced the arbitrator that Gratz had indeed spent an exces-
sive amount of time on union business.2lI The arbitrator sus-
tained Max Factor's contention that Gratz should have spent 
more time on production work and found that her failure to do 
so was a valid cause for discipline and discharge.1S 
Max Factor then unsuccessfully petitioned the Board to de-
fer to the arbitrator's decision. U In turn, the Board and inter-
venor Gratz petitioned the Ninth Circuit for enforcement of the 
Board's Order. III 
C. BACKGROUND 
Policies in Conflict 
The problem facing the Ninth Circuit in Max Factor was 
the continuing tension and reSUlting debate which has developed 
from the attempt to reconcile two apparently conflicting policies. 
On the one hand) Congress has directed the Board to prevent 
persons or organizations from engaging in unfair labor prac-
tices.1e On the other, the grievance and arbitration process has 
won judicial and statutory favor as a desirable method for set-
tling employment-related grievance disputes. I? In those cases 
20. Id. at 804. 
21. 640 F.2d at 201. 
22. Id. However, the ALJ noted that while Max Factor had always paid the chief 
steward for time spent on union business during working hours, the amount of time 
necessary and appropriate had become the source of a continuing dispute since at least 
1970. Max Factor & Co., 239 N.L.R.B. at 806. 
The ALJ also found that various factors outside Gratz's control (massive lay-offs, 
changes in the bargaining agreement increasing the number of forms and reports, and a 
change in Max Factor's management personnel) added to her workload during this pe-
riod and made it necessary for her to spend more time on union activities. Id. at 816. 
23. 640 F.2d at 201. 
24. 239 N.L.R.B. at 804. 
25. 640 F.2d at 199. 
26. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 158 (1976). 
27. For a general discussion of the duty of the parties to a collective bargaining 
agreement to arbitrate, see R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, 540-74 (1976). 
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where a party turns to the Board for redress, and at the same 
time has access to a private solution through the grievance ma-
chinery available pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, 
the Board must decide whether a remedy can only be found 
under the Act, or whether the Board will defer to arbitration. 
Evolution of the Spielberg Doctrine 
Arbitration has long been recognized as the method 
whereby employers and the representatives of their employees 
meet and resolve differences. II Arbitration has been approved by 
Congress;19 and granted judicial favor by the Supreme Court in 
the "Steelworkers' Trilogy."ao 
The Board also recognizes the role of the arbitrator in the 
grievance process and, in some. instances, will defer to arbitra-
tors' awards even though one of the antagonists in the labor dis-
pute seeks a resolution of the grievance with the federal agency 
itself. In Spielberg Manufacturing CO.,81 the Board enumerated 
the criteria it uses to determine whether to retain jurisdiction or 
defer to the arbitrator's award as: (1) the fairness and regularity 
of the arbitration proceeding; (2) the presence or absence of an 
agreement between all parties to be bound by the arbitrator's 
award; and (3) whether the arbitrator's award is clearly repug-
nant to the Act.1I The Board added that this newly created pol-
icy of deference to arbitration awards would produce "the desir-
able objective of encouraging the voluntary settlement of labor 
disputes. "aa 
The trend toward deference to arbitration was given added 
impetus by the Board in Collyer Insulated Wire. 14 In Collyer. 
28. Professor Gorman believes that "our society ordinarily places a premium on the 
resolution of disputes through private machinery freely created by the parties rather 
than by the intervention of government." Id. at 729·30. 
29. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1976), reads in part: "[AI contract ... to settle by arbitration 8 
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract . . ., or an Bil'eement in writing to 
submit to. arbitration an exillting controversy arising out of such. contract. . ., shall be 
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable ...• " 
30. United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United 
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United 
Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). 
31. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). 
32. Id. at 1082. 
33.1d. 
34. 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971). 
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the collective bargaining agreement provided for arbitration, 
and, because the issues were contractual in nature, the Board 
held arbitration to be the appropriate remedy.8~ However, no at-
tempt at that option had been made by the parties. The Board 
ruled it would nevertheless defer to arbitration, even without a 
final arbitrator's award. s6 
The Collyer ruling expanded the Spielberg position consid-
erably. In Spielberg, the arbitration proceeding took place prior 
to the hearing before the ALJ;S7 in Collyer, arbitration had not 
yet occurred.88 The Board retained jurisdiction over the dispute 
in Collyer, but only to entertain a motion that arbitration did 
not proceed as required under the Spielberg guidelines.s9 
In National Radio CO.,40 the Board, in a three-to-two deci-
sion,n extended the pre-arbitration deferral doctrine of Collyer 
to section 8(a)(3) cases.42 The company in National Radio was 
charged with anti-union animus when it discharged a union rep-
resentative for refusing to comply with a unilaterally imposed 
reporting condition required of him and other union stewards.4B 
Following a change in Board membership," National Radio 
35. 1d. at 837. 
36. 1d. at 842. 
37. In Spielberg, four employees pressed unfair labor practice charges against the 
company when it failed to reinstate them at the direction of an arbitrator. The parties 
had previously agreed to arbitrate the question and be bound by the arbitrator's deci-
sion. 112 N.L.R.B. at 1081. In Cary v. Westinghouse Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 272 (1964), the 
Supreme Court found no barrier to the use of arbitration, even though the dispute might 
eventually go to the Board. 
38. 192 N.L.R.B. at 842. 
39. 1d. at 843. 
40. 198 N.L.R.B. 527 (1972). 
41. Chairman Miller was joined by Board members Kennedy and Penello to form 
the majority. Members Jenkins and Fanning dissented, as they did in Collyer. 1d. at 532. 
See Simon-Rose, Deferral Under Collyer by the NLRB of Section 8(0)(3) Cases, 27 
LAB. L.J. 201 (1976) for additional discussion of the expansion of Collyer in National 
Radio. 
42. 198 N.L.R.B. at 531. 
43. 1d. at 527. 
44. By 1977, the three Collyer advocates, Miller, Kennedy and Brown had left the 
Board, and were replaced by Murphy, Penello and Walther. Members Penello and 
Walther continued to hold the Collyer viewpoint. Now, however, Chairman Murphy 
joined Jenkins and Fanning in support of a new approach to deferral to arbitration 
awards. Jenkins and Fanning had previously dissented in Collyer and National Radio. 
Id. at 810 n.7. See also Novack, Cutting Back On Collyer: The First Step in the Right 
Direction, 28 LAB. L.J. 785 (1977). 
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was overruled by General American Transportation CO.411 The 
Board now appears to limit the occasions when it will defer to 
an arbitrator's award to those situations analogous to 
Spielberg:48 the award has already been issued by an arbitrator 
and meets the Spielberg criteria. 
Significantly, while the Board has deferred to arbitration, it 
has never abdicated its statutory authority to those nonadminis-
trative platforms.47 The Board has always maintained that def-
erence to arbitration awards would be granted at its discretion 
and only when the clearly enumerated criteria of Spielberg were 
present. Even after the expansion of the deferral policy under 
Collyer, the Board has retained jurisdiction in order to assure 
the Spielberg standards were met. Consequently, any arbitration 
award under Collyer could still be reviewed.411 
D. THE HOLDING OF Max Factor 
Deferral to Arbitration Denied under Spielberg 
The Board, in its decision, ruled that the arbitration pro-
ceedings appeared to be fair and regular;49 thus, they met the 
first Spielberg standard.llo The reason given by the Board, how-
ever, for not deferring was that such deferral "would engender a 
result repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act. "Ill 
Writing for the Ninth Circuit panel, Judge Schwarzer ob-
45. 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977). Union steward Perry Soape, Jr., was laid off' by the 
company. He claimed that General American was motivated by anti-union animus; the 
company alleged its action was necessary because of lack of work. rd. at 813. In a three-
to-two decision, the Board refused to defer to arbitration as requested by the company. 
ld. at 808. 
46. The majority opinion in General American criticized Collyer and its progeny, 
but did not specifically denounce Spielberg. ld. at 809. 
47. See, e.g., Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1081 (1955) ("(Tlhe Board is 
not bound, as a matter of law, by an arbitration award."); NLRB v. Walt Disney Prod., 
146 F.2d 44, 48 (9th Cir.) ("Clearly agreements between private parties cannot restrict 
the jurisdiction of the Board."), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 877 (1944). 
48. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. at 843. 
49. Max Factor & Co., 239 N.L.R.B. at 804. 
50. The Ninth Circuit panel stated that the Board found the proceedings were fair 
and regular, and that the parties had agreed to be bound by the arbitrator's award. 
NLRB v. Max Factor and Co., 640 F.2d at 202. But no similar claim was made by the 
Board. In addition, intervenor Gratz protested vigorously that she had not agreed to be 
bound by the arbitrator's decision; she believed her best remedy lay with the Board. 
Brief for Intervenor at 3-5. 
51. 239 N.L.R.B. at 804 (emphasis added). 
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served that the Board's decision failed to provide supporting 
analysis for the potentially repugnant outcome of the arbitra-
tor's award.1i2 However, the court relied on the Board's "consid-
erable discretion" in this area and the findings amassed by the 
ALJ which were reasonable and consistent with the preponder-
ance of the evidence. liS Consequently, the court believed that the 
Board could reasonably conclude that Max Factor had engaged 
in unfair labor practices, and that the Board's duty to prevent 
interference with the employee's protected activities overrode 
the desirability of encouraging arbitration.1I4 
Employee's Conduct Protected by the Act 
Gratz's conduct, while probably improper, in the court's 
view was still sheltered by the Act because it occurred while she 
was engaged in protected activitylili and "was not so flagrantly 
improper as to deprive her union activities of protection under 
Section 8(a)(1) and (3)."1i6 The court compared Gratz's confron-
tation with her employer to an earlier Ninth Circuit case in 
which an employee called his general manager a liar at a griev-
ance meeting.1i7 The court recognized that passionate, verbal ex-
plosions are not uncommon in labor disputes.1i8 Gratz called Max 
Factor's Personnel Manager a "liar," a "racist," a "big phoney" 
and a "little twerp" on separate occasions, all in the context of 
her union activities.1i8 Although her language was extreme, abu-
sive and discourteous, the court found her manner not so totally 
shocking to the sensitivities of those with whom she dealt so as 
to forfeit the protection of the Act.80 
E. DISCUSSION AND CRITIQUE 
An Emerging Trend in the Ninth Circuit 
In Max Factor, the Ninth Circuit appears to be solidifying a 
trend in this Circuit to uphold refusals by the Board to defer to 
52. 640 F.2d at 204. 
53.Id. 
54. Id. n.7. 
55. Id. at 205. 
56.Id. 
57. Id. (citing Hawaiian Hauling Servo Ltd. V. NLRB, 545 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1976), 
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977». 
58. E.g., Hawaiian Hauling Servo Ltd. V. NLRB, 545 F.2d at 676 n.8. 
59. For a detailed discussion of these incidents, see note 11 supra. 
60. 640 F.2d at 205. 
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arbitration, particularly in section 8(a)(3) cases. 
The Ninth Circuit recognized the Board's continuing juris-
diction over section 8(a)(3) disputes as early as 1945 in NLRB v. 
Walt Disney.s1 More recently, it held that the Board would not 
abuse its discretion in refusing to defer, and that the Board's 
decisions should be enforced, as long as the Board followed its 
own standards. U 
In Stephenson v. NLRB,S3 the court ruled that the Board 
should not defer if the arbitrator has not decided the statutory 
issues. Under those circumstances, the Board must review. The 
Board may not presume that the arbitrator resolved the statu-
tory issues; the record must clearly show that those questions 
have been considered and answered.s4 
Douglas Aircraft Co. v. NLRB,SD the Ninth Circuit decision 
holding for deferral to the arbitrator's award, and the most re-
cent decision by the Ninth Circuit in this line of cases, was dis-
tinguished in Max Factor.es In Douglas Aircraft, the court held 
that the arbitrator's award must not be set aside where the arbi-
trator has based his decision on two independent grounds, one of 
which is permissible, even though the alternative basis may be 
impermissible. Under those circumstances, the award would not 
be clearly repugnant to the Act." The ambiguity in Douglas Air-
craft stemmed from the language of the arbitrator's award, not 
from the conduct of the parties." Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit 
61. 146 F.2d 44 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 877 (1944). 
62. Hawaiian Hauling Servo Ltd. v. NLRB, 545 F.2d 674, 676 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977) ("In reviewing the Board, we must insure that it adheres to 
its own standards until they are properly changed by the Board."). 
63. 550 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1977). 
64. Id. at 538. In Max Factor, the Ninth Circuit questioned whether the insistence 
that statutory issues be clearly resolved as specified by Stephenson was misplaced. The 
court described the issue as a "matter of deep controversy in the [arbitration) profes-
sion." 640 F.2d at 203 n.6. 
65. 609 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1979). 
66. 640 F.2d at 203. 
67. Id. (citing Douglas Aircraft CO. V. NLRB, 609 F.2d at 355). 
68. McMurphy, a discharged employee, filed unfair labor practice charges against 
Douglas Aircraft Company, and a grievance with his union on the same day. The charge 
was deferred to arbitration under the then-controlling Collyer policy. The union and the 
company attempted to settle their dispute with McMurphy, one condition being his 
withdrawal of the § 8(a)(3) charges pending before the NLRB. McMurphy refused. The 
arbitrator's award granted reinstatement without back-pay. 609 F.2d at 353. 
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chose not to impose the same standard on the Board in Max 
Factor. 89 
Douglas Aircraft arguably may be read as a very narrow 
holding, applicable only in that situation where the arbitrator's 
award is based on an ambiguous decision containing two or more 
grounds which may be read either independently or cumula-
tively. The Max Factor court makes clear that similar ambiguity 
is not present in the arbitrator's opinion here.'1° The Board's re-
fusal to defer is not based on any lack of clarity but on the re-
pugnance of the arbitrator's award to the Act. 
Results Repugnant to the Act 
The Ninth Circuit accepted the Board's finding that defer-
ral to the arbitrator's award would result in an outcome repug-
nant to the purposes and policies of the Act, and would not af-
ford the protection necessary for section 7 rights. This finding 
alone is adequate to invalidate the award under the Spielberg 
criteria, even if both additional standards are met. The major 
problem with Max Factor, however, is that the court does not 
elaborate with any specificity what test it has applied to define 
results repugnant to the Act.'ll The court accepted at face value 
the Board's determination that the arbitrator's award would cre-
At the request of the union and the company, the arbitrator clarified hiB re890ne for 
the award. One reason for the refusal to order back-pay W89 the employee's pattern of 
abusive conduct at work. The other W89 the employee's refusal to withdraw the unfair 
labor practice charges. The court held that the Board must defer to the original award, 
even though ambiguous, since clarification of that award revealed a permissible re89on. 
The impermissible re890n W89 described by the court 89 "harmless error." Id. at 354. 
69. At le89t one circuit has split with the Ninth over the implication of Douglas 
Aircraft. See NLRB v. Pincus Bros. Inc.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1980) (citing 
Douglas Aircraft in ordering deferral to an arbitrator's award which ruled on arguably 
impermissible employee conduct). The discharged employee in Pincus abused work time 
to write and distribute leaflets critical of her employer. The Third Circuit found that 
permissible and impermissible re890ns for an award would not render the award clearly 
repugnant to the Act. In addition, the actions of the employee in Pincus were arguably 
unprotected in nature. The Ninth Circuit refused to follow Pincus for several re89ons, 
the most compelling of which W89 the importance of relying on the protected status of 
the employee's conduct. The employee in Max Factor W89 engaged in protected activity 
which must not be interfered with. 640 F.2d at 204 n.7. In Ad Art, Inc. v. NLRB, 645 
F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1980) (89 amended Jan. 1981), the court again declined to follow Pin-
cus. Here the court followed Max Factor in finding the Board properly refused to defer 
to the arbitrator's award; the court ordered reinstatement and back pay to the employee 
in enforcement of the Board's order. 
70. 640 F.2d at 203. 
71. Id. at 204. 
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ate a repugnant result. The Board, unfortunately, gave no rea-
sons and cited no facts in support of its position.72 The Board 
merely stated that the arbitrator failed to pass on the unfair 
labor practice considerations which the ALJ found to be 
significant. "78 
The dissenting panel member noted that the Board failed to 
discuss the reasons for its findings and recommended the case be 
remanded for clarification by the Board.?4 The majority ac-
cepted the brief statement by the Board as sufficient. Nonethe-
less, future litigants in similar circumstances would have been 
aided by a more specific discussion by the Board as to what con-
duct it finds worthy of protection in this difficult area. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The outcome of this case hinges on the specific facts sur-
rounding the discipline and discharge of Max Factor's union 
steward. Max Factor pursued both permissible and impermissi-
ble purposes;?!! the court believed the impermissible motives 
dominated. Gratz, for her part, committed arguably improper 
actions during the course of protected activity.?e The court 
found that her actions were not so blatantly improper as to for-
feit all protection afforded her union activities by sections 
8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3). The conduct of discharged employees and 
the motives of their employers often fall into similar twilight ar-
eas of arguable impropriety. The Ninth Circuit weighed the mo-
tives and actions of both parties and found that a determination 
in favor of the employee promotes, to the greater degree, the 
purposes and policies of the Act. 
The Max Factor court appears to be correct in its holding. 
It has distinguished Douglas Aircraft in its opinion, thereby ef-
fectively limiting an expansion of Douglas in this circuit.77 In 
72. 239 N.L.R.B. at 805. 
73. [d. 
74. 640 F.2d at 205. 
75. [d. 
76. [d. 
77. This was in spite of the opening made available by the Third Circuit in Pincus. 
See note 69 supra. 
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addition, it has reinforced the Board's attempt to protect the 
employee's rights under the National Labor Relations Act. It did 
that, using the standards set by the Board itself under the 
Spielberg doctrine. The real problem for the Ninth Circuit in 
this area may yet occur, should a change in Board membership 
alter those standards once again. 
Alice Guckeen 
III. PACIFIC NORTHWEST CHAPTER OF THE 
ASSOCIATED BUILDERS AND CONTRACTORS, INC. 
u. NLRB: THE NINTH CIRCUIT BROADLY 
INTERPRETS SECTION 8(e) OF THE NATIONAL 
LABOR RELATIONS ACT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Pacific Northwest Chapter of the Associated Builders 
and Contractors, Inc. u. NLRB/ the Ninth Circuit enlarged the 
scope of the construction industry proviso to section 8(e) of the 
National Labor Relations Act by holding, inter alia, that, as a 
matter of law, union signatory subcontracting agreements are 
protected from secondary boycott proscriptions when obtained 
in a collective bargaining context. Rejecting a narrower interpre-
tation of section 8(e), the Ninth Circuit upheld such agree-
ments-even if they embrace job sites at which no members of 
the signatory union are employed.1 The court stressed legislative 
history and practical considerations in reaching its result. 
The Union Signatory Subcontracting Agreements 
The Ninth Circuit consolidated for rehearing before a lim-
ited en banc panel two separate orders of the National Labor 
Relations Board (the Board).8 The court enforced both orders in 
their entirety, reversing the decision of a three-judge panel. 4 The 
first order concerned a collective bargaining agreement between 
Local 701 of the International Union of Operating Engineers 
1. 654 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Canby. C.J.), rev'g 609 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 
1979), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3245 (1981) (No. 80·1808). 
2. 654 F.2d at 1320. Union signatory subcontracting agreements prevent a general 
contractor from subcontracting work to another employer unless the subcontractor has a 
collective bargaining agreement with the signatory union. 
3. Id. at 1304. 
4. Id. at 1324. 
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(the Engineers) and the Oregon-Columbia Chapter of the Asso-
ciated General Contractors of America, Inc. (AGC), a bargaining 
agent representing about 200 construction employers from Ore-
gon and Washington.& The collective bargaining agreement con-
tained a clause prohibiting AGC from contracting "any work 
covered by the Agreement to be done at the site of the construc-
tion, alteration, painting or repair of a building, structure or 
other work to any person, firm or company who does not have an 
existing labor agreement with the [Engineers'] Union covering 
such work."G A self-help clause allowed either party to "take 
such action as they deem necessary"-including strikes and 
lockouts-when one party failed to comply with the decision of a 
grievance and arbitration proceeding.' 
The Pacific Northwest Chapter of the Associated Builders 
and Contractors, Inc. complained that the collective bargaining 
agreement violated section 8(e) of the National Labor Relations 
Act (NLRA).8 The Board disagreed, finding that the questioned 
clause fell within the construction industry proviso to section 
8(e).8 However, the Board also determined that the self-help 
clause violated section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)1° which condemns the use 
of economic pressure to enforce such a clause,l1 except in the 
5. Id. at 1304. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. at 1305. 
8. Id. Section 8(e) provides: 
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organiza-
tion and any employer to enter into any contract or agree-
ment, express or implied, whereby such employer ceases or re-
frains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, 
selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the prod-
ucts of another employer, or to cease doing business with any 
other person, and any contract or agreement entered into 
heretofor or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be 
to such extent unenforceable and void: Provided, That noth-
ing in this subsection shall apply to an agreement between a 
labor organization and an employer in the construction in-
dustry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of !Oork 
to be done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting 
or repair of a building, structure or other work . ... 
29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976) (emphasis added). A further proviso exempting the apparel 
industry from such agreements and from 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) is omitted. 
9. 654 F.2d at 1305. 
10. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1976). 
11. 654 F.2d at 1324. 
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apparel industry. 12 
The second Board order involved picketing and work stop-
pages by a union seeking a successor collective bargaining agree-
ment. The union sought a contract provision limiting subcon-
tracting at any construction jobsite to "a person, firm, or 
corporation, party to an appropriate, current labor agreement 
with the appropriate union, or subordinate body signatory to 
this Agreement. "18 When negotiations floundered over this pro-
posed provision,14 Locals 235 and 944 of the United Brotherhood 
of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO (Carpenters) 
picketed worksites of the employer, Woelke and Romero Fram-
ing, Inc. (Woelke).l& Woelke charged the Carpenters with violat-
ing sections 8(b)(4)(i) and 8(b)(4)(ii)(A),1· by pressuring the em-
ployer "to enter into any agreement which is prohibited by 
section 8(e)."17 The Board decided instead that the construction 
industry proviso to section 8(e) rather than section 8(b)(4)18 cov-
ered the proposed agreement. 18 Again, the Ninth Circuit en-
forced the Board's order.ao 
12. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976). See note 8 supra for text of § 158(e). 
13. 654 F.2d at 1306. 
14. The parties did not agree on 8everal other issues not before the Ninth Circuit. 
[d. at 1305 n.3. 
15. [d. at 1306. 
16. Subsections 158(b)(4)(i) and 158(b)(4)(ii)(A) provide: 
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization 
or its agents-
(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individ-
ual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an 
industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal 
in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, 
transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, 
materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to 
threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce 
or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an 
object thereof is-
(A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-em-
ployed person to join any labor or employer organiza-
tion or to enter into any agreement which is prohibited 
by subsection (e) of this section .... 
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i) (1976); 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(A) (1976). For the text of § 
158(e), see note 8 supra. 
17. 654 F.2d at 1306. 
18. [d. 
19. [d. 
20. [d. at 1304. 
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Analyzing the AGC agreement and the proposed Woelke 
provision, the Ninth Circuit court addressed four issues21 central 
to both subcontracting agreements: (1) whether the subcontract-
ing agreements contravened section 8(e) by being secondary in 
nature; (2) whether the construction industry proviso to section 
8(e) exempted these clauses from its proscription; (3) whether 
picketing or striking to secure agreement to lawful subcontract-
ing clauses violated section 8(b)(4); and (4) whether picketing or 
striking to enforce such subcontracting clauses violated section 
8(b)(4). 
The Ninth Circuit rejected two arguments made by the En-
gineers, and concluded that these subcontracting clauses re-
flected secondary purposes. III Having found the union signatory 
subcontracting clauses within the scope and proscription of sec-
tion 8(e), the court then turned to an analysis of the construc-
tion industry proviso. lIB After reviewing the legislative history of 
section 8(e), and the labor background of the construction in-
dustry in general, the court focused on Connell Construction Co. 
v. Plumbers Local 100.14 Though Connell is inapposite on sev-
eral main points, the Ninth Circuit court drew support from it 
in holding that union signatory subcontracting clauses are ex-
21. ld. at 1307. The majority actually addressed at least one other issue. AGC con-
tended that even if § 8(e) allowed subcontracting agreements, it did not permit a "partic-
ular-union" subcontracting agreement. ld. at 1323. The Ninth Circuit refused to so limit 
the construction industry proviso, noting that nothing in the language of § 8(e) sup-
ported such a limitation. 
22. The Supreme Court articulated a test for primary and secondary agreements in 
National Woodwork Mfn. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967). Primary agreements, 
lawful under § 8(e), are those in which "the agreement or its maintenance is addressed to 
the labor relations of the contracting employer vis-a-vis his own employees." ld. at 645. 
Secondary agreements, on the other hand, are generally prohibited by § 8(e). A secon-
dary agreement is "tactically calculated to satisfy union objectives elsewhere." ld. at 644. 
A popular description of a secondary boycott is that of Judge Learned Hand: 
The gravamen of a secondary boycott is that its sanctions 
bear, not upon the employer who alone is a party to the dis-
pute, but upon some third party who has no concern in it. Its 
aim is to compel him to stop business with the employer in the 
hope that this will induce the employer to give in to his em-
ployee's demands. 
IBEW Local 501 v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 341 U.S. 694 (1950). 
23. 654 F.2d at 1308. See note 8 supra for the text of the proviso. The great weight 
of the court's opinion is devoted to this issue. Subsequent discussion of the Ninth Cir-
cuit's analysis and the legislative and judicial background of § 8(e) is directed toward the 
holding on this matter. 
24. 421 U.S. 616 (1975). 
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cepted from the coverage of section 8(e) by the construction in-
dustry proviso.2& 
The Ninth Circuit found the third and fourth issues raised 
to be capable of quick disposition. Both elementary statutory 
construction and Ninth Circuit and NLRB precedent defeated 
Woelke's claim that picketing to coerce acceptance of a subcon-
tracting provision violates section 8(b)(4)(ii)(A).18 However, 
picketing or striking to enforce a union signatory subcontracting 
agreement is not contemplated by section 8(e).1'7 Thus the self-
help enforcement clause in the AGC-Engineers agreement is 
void absent arbitration or judicial action.ls 
B. A BRIEF BACKGROUND 
The Landrum-Griffin Act: An Inconclusive Legislative History 
Secondary pressure and union signatory subcontracting 
clauses did not violate the letter of the original National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA).lItI The dramatic rise in unionization, la-
bor union abuses, and the end of World War II contributed to 
25. 654 F.2d at 1320. 
26. Id. at 1323. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(A) (1976). See note 16 supra for the text 
of § 8(b)(4), which prohibits coercion to achieve agreements outlawed in § 8(e). The 
Ninth Circuit, having found no § 8(e) violation, could see no violation under § 
8(b)(4)(ii)(A). Such agreements need not be reached voluntarily. Construction, Laborers, 
Local 383 v. NLRB, 323 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1963); Northeastern Ind. Bldg. & Constr. 
Council, 148 N.L.R.B. 854 (1964), remanded on other grounds, 352 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 
1965). 
27. 654 F.2d at 1324. See note 8 supra for the text of § 8{e). The construction 
industry proviso, unlike the companion proviso for the apparel industry, does not ex-
empt such agreements (rom the reach of § 8{b)(4)(ii)(B). NLRB V. IBEW, 405 F.2d 159, 
163-64 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 921 (1969). 
28. 654 F.2d at 1324. 
29. Until the TaCt-Hartley Amendments, Labor-Management Relations (TaCt-
Hartley) Act, ch. 120, §§ 1-507, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 
(1976)), CongreBB had effectively exempted labor from secondary boycott liability under 
the Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, §§ 1-8, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) {current version at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976)), and the Clayton Act, ch. 323 § 16,38 Stat. 730, 737 (1914) (current 
version at 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976)), except for conduct in furtherance of a conspiracy with 
a nonlabor group. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 640 (l975); 
National Woodwork Mfrs. ASB'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 616, 623 (1967). See AIle!) Bradley 
Co. v. IBEW, Local 3, 325 U.S. 797 (l945); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 
(l94l). Prior to the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), unions had no exemption 
from antitrust laws for secondary strikes and boycotts. Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Jour-
neymen Stone Cutters Ass'n, 247 U.S. 37 (1927); Duplex Printing PreBB Co. v. Deering, 
254 U.S. 443 (l920). Discussion of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is beyond the scope of this 
Note. 
37
Slizeski et al.: Labor Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1982
284 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:279 
the passage,80 over President Truman's veto, of the Taft-Hartley 
Act in 1947.81 The Taft-Hartley Act introduced significant 
changes in the NLRA, directed mainly at achieving federal regu-
lation of certain union activities.82 Congress subdivided section 8 
into sections 8(a), which retained the unfair employer labor 
practices enumerated in the original NLRA, 8(b), which added 
six unfair union labor practices, and 8(c), which introduced a 
free speech provision.ss Section 8(b)(4) prohibited an induce-
ment not to handle goods or perform services with the object of 
advancing a secondary boycott.84 
Though the terms of section 8(b)(4) seemed to prevent sec-
ondary boycotts, Congress perceived that the Board and the 
courts had created substantial loopholes.811 Therefore, Congress 
enacted the Landrum-Griffin Act.se In addition to closing other 
perceived loopholes in section 8(b),87 Congress attacked a potent 
Teamsters Union secondary boycott weapon-the "hot cargo" 
clause.88 Section 8(e) directly foreclosed the use of the "hot 
cargo" clause,89 unless the clause satisfied a primary objective, 
such as work preservation,·o or came under one of the two 
provisos. 
The legislative history of the Landrum-Griffin amendments 
30. D. WOLLERT & B. AARON, LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LAW 109 (2d ed. 1960). 
31. Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, §§ 1-507, 61 Stat. 
136 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1976». 
32. 1 J. JENKINS, LABOR LAW § 2.25 (1968). 
33. 61 Stat. 140-2 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)-(c) (1976). 
34. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976). 
35. Goldberg & Meiklejohn, Title VII: Taft-Hartley Amendments with Emphasis 
on the Legislative History, 54 Nw. U.L. REV. 747, 760 (1960). 
36. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, 
Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 543 (1959) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976». 
37. One such closure extended the prohibitions of § 8(b)(4)(A) to any individual. 
The original version had used the plural "employees," which as defined by the statute 
excluded railway, airline, public employees and supervisors. The plural term meant that 
inducements to a single employee could not be reached. NLRB v. International Rice 
Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 671 (1951). 
38. Goldberg & Meiklejohn, supra note 35, at 759. The "hot cargo" clause essen-
tially established a secondary boycott in advance. Under these clauses, signatory employ-
ers agreed not to require employees to handle goods from certain other employers, not to 
do business with those other employers, or both. A union signatory subcontracting clause 
is merely a variant of the "hot cargo" clause. Pacific Northwest Chapter v. NLRB, 654 
F.2d 1301, 1310 (9th Cir. 1981). 
39. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976). The text appears at note 8, supra. 
40. National Woodwork Mfrs. v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 620 (1967). 
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does not lend great insight into the scope and meaning of section 
8(e). Both the Ninth Circuit4 ! and the Supreme Court42 have re-
viewed this history on several occasions. At least four competing 
bills emerged from various congressional committees.43 In the 
House, the Landrum-Griffin bill narrowly defeated a bill re-
ported by the Labor Committee." The Landrum-Griffin bill411 
contained the forerunner of the present section 8(e) as support 
for the section 8(b) prohibitions against secondary boycotts.48 
The Senate version outlawed "hot cargo" agreements only for 
the interstate trucking industry.4'7 The Conference Committee 
compromise embraced the sweeping prohibition of the House 
bill with the addition of provisos excepting the construction and 
garment industries.48 
The Connell Decision 
In addition to the legislative history, the interpretation 
given by the Supreme Court to section 8(e) in Connell49 is cen-
tral to both the majority and the dissenters in Pacific North-
west. Connell Construction Co. (Connell), a building contractor, 
drew picketing from Local 100 because it refused to agree to 
subcontract work only to firms with a current contract with the 
union. IlO Various other unions represented Connell's employees; 
Local 100 never attempted to represent them or bargain on their 
behalf. III The union sought the agreement for only one rea-
son-to require subcontractors to recognize it as the representa-
tive of their employees.1I2 The union posted a sole picket at one 
of Connell's construction sites, work halted, and Connell signed 
41. Pacific Northwest Chapter of the Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 654 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1981) rev'g 609 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979); ACCO Constr. 
Equip., Inc. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1975). 
42. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975); National 
Woodwork Mfrs. Aas'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967). 
43. Goldberg & Meiklejohn, supra note 35, at 759-60. 
44. H.R. 8342, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). Goldberg & Meiklejohn, supra note 35, 
at 760. 
45. H.R. 8400, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). 
46. Goldberg & Meiklejohn, supra note 35, at 773. 
47. S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 707 (1959). 
48. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976). 
49. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975). 
50. Id. at 619. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 631. 
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the subcontracting agreement under protest. liS Connell had 
previously filed a state antitrust complaint against Local 100, 
and the union removed the action to federal court.1I4 Connell 
then amended its complaint to allege federal antitrust violations. 
The union defended, claiming the protection of section 8(e).1I1I 
The Supreme Court held that the construction industry 
proviso of section 8(e) afforded Local 100 no antitrust immu-
nity.1I1I The Court based its decision on three elementS: (1) a re-
luctance by Congress to permit such unlimited "top-down" or-
ganizing; (2) the absence of a collective bargaining agreement; 
and (3) the absence of a common jobsite restriction in the sub-
contracting agreement directed toward limiting friction between 
union and nonunion employees. II? Therefore, the Connell sub-
contracting agreement violated section 8(e) and could be the 
foundation of a federal antitrust suit. liB 
The Connell Court reasoned that "[o]ne of the major aims 
of the 1959 Act was to limit 'top-down' organizing campaigns," 
and buttressed this proposition with the section 8(b) restriction 
on primary recognitional picketing and further additions to the 
prohibition on secondary boycotts. &8 The Court acknowledged 
the garment industry's exemption from section 8(b) and hinted 
that Congress felt less need for the use of subcontracting agree-
ments as an organizational weapon in the construction 
industry. eo 
Because the union had no collective bargaining agreement 
with Connell, "[t]he federal policy favoring collective bargaining 
... can offer no shelter for the union's coercive action against 
Connell or its campaign to exclude nonunion firms from the sub-
contracting market.""1 Thus, Local 100 became subject to anti-
53. ld. at 620. 
54. ld. 
55. ld. at 621. 
56. ld. at 633. 
57. ld. at 631-33. 
58. ld. at 634-35. In summary, the Supreme Court stated: "[W]e think [the pro-
viso's] authorization extends -only to agreements in the context of collective bargaining 
relationships and ... possibly to common-situs relationships on particular jobsites as 
well." ld. at 633. 
59. ld. at 632. 
60. ld. at 633 n.13. 
61. ld. at 626. 
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trust law as pleaded by Connell. Finally, the union's subcon-
tracting agreement faile:l-in at least two regards-to associate 
itself with the labor tranquility rationale for section 8(e). First, 
the agreement covered only the work of Local 100 members, but 
otherwise did not attempt to regulate subcontracting.s2 Thus, 
union members could find themselves working shoulder-to-
shoulder with nonunion employees. Second, the agreement went 
beyond protection of Local 100 members, since it would apply to 
jobsites where no Local 100 people worked.ss The Connell Court 
believed that to uphold this agreement would create an unlim-
ited organizational weapon.s• 
C. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS: POLICY OVER PRECEDENT? 
The Majority 
The Engineers contended that their subcontracting clause 
represented an attempt to preserve work for Local 701 members 
within the multi-employer bargaining unit of AGC-a goal 
viewed as primary by the Supreme Court in National Woodwork 
Manufacturers Association v. NLRBS&-and therefore' not sub-
ject to section 8(e).ss The Ninth Circuit rejected this interpreta-
tion because, by its language, the clause did not limit subcon-
tracting to members of AGC.s7 More importantly, however, the 
Ninth Circuit noted that any work preservation subcontrac~ing 
clause which attempts to preserve work for a multi-employer 
bargaining unit is inevitably secondary in nature,ss because it 
would require one employer to boycott another unless both 
62. Id. at 631. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. Justices Douglas, Stewart, Brennan and Marshall dissented. A brief dissent 
by Justice Douglas, who joined Justice Stewart's exhaustive dissent, emphasized his feel-
ing that "the union's conduct is regulated solely by the labor laws." Id. at 638. Justice 
Stewart presented a detailed review of legislative history in support of the conclusion 
that "Congress did not intend to restore antitrust sanctions for secondary boycott activ-
ity such as that engaged in by Local 100 in this case, but rather intended to subject such 
activity only to regulation under the National Labor Relations Act and § 303 of the 
Labor Management Relations Act." Id. at 654-55. By introducing an antitrust remedy, 
the Court altered the balance of power between labor and management that Congress 
codified. Id. at 655. 
65. 386 U.S. 612 (1967). See note 22 supra. National Woodwork concerned a single 
employer; Pacific Northwest involves a multi-employer bargaining group. 
66. 654 F.2d at 1307. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 1308. 
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agreed to the union contract.88 The Engineers also argued that 
one of the goals was preserving work for each contractor's em-
ployees and this removed the subcontracting clauses from sec-
tion 8(e).70 However, mixed objectives do not cure the infirmities 
of the clauses, the Ninth Circuit held.71 
The quandary facing the Ninth Circuit in reviewing the leg-
islative background can be stated as: (1) does the background 
indicate a congressional intent to allow union signatory subcon-
tracting clauses, and if so, (2) are they meant to be confined to 
jobsites where union members are present? The Ninth Circuit 
limited en banc majority found two sources persuasive. First the 
court cited a Conference Committee statement expressing a de-
sire not to change the then present state of the law "with respect 
to the validity of this specific type of agreement relating to work 
to be done at the site of the construction project or to remove 
the limitations which the present law imposes with respect to 
such agreements."n The majority also relied on remarks by Sen-
ator Kennedy, the Senate sponsor: "Agreements by which a con-
tractor in the construction industry promises not to subcontract 
work on a construction site to a nonunion contractor appear to 
be legal today. They will not be unlawful under § 8(e) .... "71 
For the Ninth Circuit majority then, section 8(e) did not pro-
scribe union signatory subcontracting clauses per se. 
The Ninth Circuit majority then scrutinized the legislative 
background to determine if Congress intended union signatory 
subcontracting clauses to be valid only at jobsites where union 
members worked. Here the majority viewed legislative intent in 
light of the contemporaneous decision, Local 1976, United 
Brotherhood of Carpenters v. NLRB (Sand Door):7. 
The Sand Door decision . . . , which supplied 
much of the impetus for § 8(e), had legitimized 
secondary boycotts the objectives of which clearly 
went beyond the mere avoidance of shoulder-to-
69. [d. (quoting NLRB v. Joint Council of Teamsters No. 38, 338 F.2d 23, 28 (9th 
Cir. 1964)). Accord, NLRB v. National Maritime Union, 486 F.2d 907, 914 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1973). 
70. 654 F.2d at 1308. 
71. [d. 
72. [d. at 1312. 
73. [d. 
74. 357 U.S. 93 (1958). 
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shoulder friction between workers. It is true that 
the construction industry proviso narrowed the 
geographical scope of the Sand Door rule by in-
troducing the jobsite limitation, but we do not in-
terpret the words of the proviso as indicating an 
intent to narrow the substantive scope of the 
Sand Door rule on the jobsite.70 
289 
In support of the conclusion that Congress intended no restric-
tion requiring union members' presence, the Ninth Circuit cited 
a 1959 District of Columbia Court of Appeals case" upholding 
subcontracting agreements similar to those in Pacific Northwest, 
and the testimony of one of the litigants before Congress."" 
After elaborating on the legislative and historical back-
ground of section 8(e), the Ninth Circuit distinguished Connell. 
The employers argued that Connell required the presence of 
union members at the jobsite before the disputed subcontracting 
agreements couJd apply." The Ninth Circuit majority rejected 
that argument as too narrow."e However, it conceded that "the 
Connell opinion contains considerable emphasis on problems of 
shoulder-to-shoulder friction between union and nonunion work-
ers at the jobsite, and additional emphasis on antagonism of the 
1959 Congress to 'top-down' organizing that is one of the effects 
of subcontractor agreements."80 After acknowledging the Con-
gressional hostility to "top-down" organizing emphasized in 
Connell, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that, within the context of a 
collective bargaining agreement, such an organizing weapon is 
limited by the employer's ability to assert countervailing de-
mands at the negotiating table.81 
75. 654 F.2d at 1313. 
76. Operating Eng'rs Local 3 v. NLRB, 266 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 361 
U.S. 834 (1959). 
77. 654 F.2d at 1313 and 1313 n.22. The majority also mentioned a survey sug-
gesting that a number of similar subcontracting agreements existed in 1959 and that 
Congress did not intend to alter those arrangements. Id. at 1314. Interestingly, Professor 
Cox, adviser to Senator Kennedy on the amendments, has stated that "Congress had no 
information about the prevalence or use of similar [hot cargo] clauses in other industries 
[than the apparel industry]." Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National 
Labor Relations Act, 44 MINN. L. REV. 257, 273-74 (1959). 
78. 654 F.2d at 1314. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 1321. 
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But, at the least, the absence of a collective bargaining 
agreement and the resultant antitrust focus of Connell allowed 
the Ninth Circuit to infuse additional factors into its decision. 
These factors included: (1) conditions of the construction indus-
try, and the various considerations affecting it; (2) limits on 
"top-down" organizing imposed by the collective bargaining con-
text; and (3) certain practical matters. 
The Ninth Circuit believed that, when pursued in the 
course of collective bargaining, union signatory subcontracting 
clauses reflect a variety of both primary and secondary interests 
beyond jobsite friction.8lI Unlike the union's purely secondary 
objective in Connell, Local 701 faced the task of protecting wage 
levels and benefits in a situation where "the work force of any 
given employer-contractor or subcontractor-is highly flexible 
and grows or diminishes or even disappears depending on the 
temporary contracting or subcontracting arrangements at any 
particular jobsite."88 Through subcontracting, mUltiple employ-
ers may hire a few workers for short periods of time, and the 
fluidity of such arrangements raises union interests beyond the 
avoidance of union-nonunion friction. Because "working condi-
tions applicable to one set of workers may very well affect others 
working on the same project,"1W a subcontracting agreement pur-
sued by a union representing employees of the prime contractor 
can reflect several primary objectives. 
The court maintained that the Connell opinion, particularly 
its discussion of section 8(e)'s legislative history, "is sensitive 
both to the interconnection of interests between employees of 
the various contractors and subcontractors and the broad man-
ner in which any or all of these factors may be exhibited at the 
jobsite."811 As authority, the Ninth Circuit quoted extensively 
from a Senator's statement-referred to only by way of footnote 
citation in Connell-describing the integral nature of construc-
tion projects and lack of neutrality among such employers." The 
Supreme Court's bare citation attempted to support the conten-
tion that section 8(e) may have been intended to overrule a case 
82. [d. at 1317. 
83. [d. at 1316. 
84. [d. at 1317·18. 
85. [d. at 1318. 
86. [d. at 1318·19. 
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which prohibited jobsite picketing of a contractor whose nonun-
ion subcontractor was working at the jobsite.87 The Ninth Cir-
cuit found in other sources cited by the Connell opinion similar 
references to the community of interests at the jobsite.88 
The presence of a collective bargaining agreement8S is criti-
cal to the Ninth Circuit's holding that the present provisions 
may lawfully extend beyond a single jobsite to other sites where 
union members may not even be employed.so The Ninth Circuit 
theorized that the collective bargaining context imposes limits 
on the "top-down" organizing effect of subcontracting agree-
ments.SI Despite the fact that "[t]here is some 'top-down or-
ganizing' effect in any subcontracting agreement, including those 
which all parties must admit would be valid and within the pro-
viso,"s2 the Ninth Circuit majority argued that Congress in-
tended to legitimize these effects out of recognition for the com-
munity of jobsite interests.ss Because the union in Connell 
avoided section 8(b) limits on coercive secondary pressure by its 
avowed disinterest in organizing or representing Connell em-
ployees, the subcontracting agreement could not be upheld in 
light of congressional hostility to "top-down" organizing.94 But 
the Ninth Circuit felt that the unions in Pacific Northwest pos-
sessed no such unlimited weapon. If the agreements are sought 
87. Id. (citing Connell). The case referred to by the Connell Court is NLRB v. 
Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951). The Supreme Court's state-
ment is curious in light of the Conference Committee report on § 8(e) which stated: 
"Restrictions and limitations imposed upon such picketing under present law as inter-
preted, for example, iii the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the Denver Building Trades 
case would remain in full force and effect." 105 CONGo REC. 17,900 (1959), reprinted in 
[1959) U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2512. 
88. 654 F.2d at 1319. The Ninth Circuit frequently derived these sources from foot-
notes in the Connell opinion. See id. n.34, particularly Comment, The Impact of the 
Taft-Hartley Act on the Building and Construction Industry, 60 YALE L.J. 673, 684-89 
(1951) discussing "numerous other interests that a union representing a primary group of 
employees may have in the employment arrangements of other employees at the jobsite." 
89. The AGC agreement appeared in their contract with the Engineers. The 
Woelke-Carpenters provision entered into negotiations to renew their collective bargain-
ing agreement. 654 F.2d at 1316 n.29. For a discussion of the contract provisions, see text 
accompanying notes 5-14 supra. 
90. 654 F.2d at 1316. The court further noted a theoretical possibility supporting 
such union signatory subcontracting clauses in the absence of a collective bargaining re-
lationship. Id. at 1321 n.37. 
91. Id. at 1321. 
92. Id. at 1320. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 1321. 
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during organizational or recognitional picketing, the union is 
subject to the strictures of section 8(b).811 If sought by a union 
already representing the contractor's employees, the employer 
may counter with other demands as part of the negotiating 
calculus. Therefore, "the existence of a collective bargaining re-
lationship clearly brings a union signatory subcontracting agree-
ment within the proviso of § 8(e)."" The Ninth Circuit went on 
to state that such an agreement may be valid absent a collective 
bargaining relationship if the potential for jobsite friction be-
tween represented workers and another employer's workers ac-
tually exists.87 
Practical considerations also contributed to the Ninth Cir-
cuit holding. For example, "[j]obsite by jobsite negotiation of 
subcontract agreements would seem burdensome to the point of 
impossibility."8s The alternative-permitting the subcontracting 
agreements to be triggered when union members appeared.at the 
jobsite-poses severe· enforcement problems.8' Such an alterna-
tive could also foster anti-union discrimination by employers. 
The Dissents 
The dissenters emphasized the antitrust and "top-down" 
organizing effects of union signatory subcontracting agreements 
rather than the special conditions of the construction industry. 
Using the Connell opinion as a starting point, the dissenters 
condemned the majority holding for three reasons. First, a signa-
95. Id. 
96. Id. (emphasis in original). 
97. Id. n.37. This hypothetical possibility is based on the Connell opinion's lan-
guage quoted at note 75 supra. 
98. Id. at 1322. This practical concern is strongly reflected in § 8(f), which autho-
rizes "pre-hire" agreements. Construction industry unions may represent and obtain col-
lective bargaining agreements for workers not yet hired and before the majority status of 
the union has been determined. 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1976). The District of Columbia Cir-
cuit, in an important decision, has held that § 8(f) agreements are sufficient to trigger § 
8(e) protection for union signatory subcontracting clauses. Donald Shriver, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 635 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Thus a construction union representing workers 
under either § 9(a) (exclusive bargaining representative elected by a majority of a proper 
unit) or § 8(f) satisfies the collective bargaining context required by Connell, at least in 
the District of Columbia Circuit. 
99. 654 F.2d at 1322. The limited en banc majority emphasized "the difficulty of 
defining the applicable time span during which jobsite conflict is threatened" and the 
temporary quality of employment arrangements at construction jobsites. Id. Responding 
to the dissenters, the majority reasoned that compliance with subcontracting agreements 
is easier to monitor than the presence of a union worker at any particular time. Id. n.38. 
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tory employer sacrifices the "right to choose the more efficient 
subcontractor. Preservation of this opportunity would be more 
consistent with the primary concern of Connell than is the posi-
tion of the en banc court. "100 Even a more efficient nonsignatory 
subcontracting firm that adheres to union standards of wages 
and conditions is foreclosed from the jobsite.lol Second, the dis-
senters stated that Connell-and pre-Connell Ninth Circuit in-
vestigations into the legislative history of section 8(e)10I-found 
jobsite friction to be the main congressional concern. loa There-
fore, the extension of subcontracting agreements to jobsites 
where the signatory union had no members employed flouted 
congressional intent. Finally, the majority holding's assertion 
that Congress intended to preserve construction industry collec-
tive bargaining patterns as they existed in 1959 contained falla-
cies. The proviso partially overruled the Sand DoorlOf case of 
1958 and "[f]urthermore, the lawfulness and permissible scope 
of subcontractor agreements had not been conclusively deter-
mined in 1959."1011 The dissenters also suggested that the unions 
could obtain comparable results by a primary m'ethod-the 
union standards clause. lOCI 
The dissentersl07 claimed that Congress mainly intended to 
alleviate jobsite friction, thereby limiting subcontracting agree-
ments to jobsites with union members present. lOS The dissenters 
were swayed by pervasive references in the legislative record to 
the proximity of union and nonunion workers as well as by a 
100. 1d. at 1326. (Sneed, J., dissenting). Judge Farris, author of the other dissent-
ing opinion voiced a similar criticism: "In Connell ... , the Supreme Court concluded 
that the construction industry proviso did not authorize a construction industry em-
ployer and a union not representing its employees to agree to limit the employer's right 
to subcontract." 1d. at 1327 (citations omitted). 
101. 1d. at 1325 (Sneed, J., dissenting). 
102. Pacific Northwest Chapter of the Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 609 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 654 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1981); ACCO Constr. 
Equip., Inc. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1975). 
103. 654 F.2d at 1326. 
104. Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93 (1958). 
105. 654 F.2d at 1327. 
106. 1d. 
107. Though two dissents appeared in Pacific Northwest, the author of one, Judge 
Farris, joined Judge Sneed's dissent "in all respects" and merely added "some comments 
regarding the scope of the construction industry proviso." 1d. Therefore, this Note treats 
the two dissents 88 one. 
108. 1d. at 1326. 
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previous Ninth Circuit opinion1oe by a dissenter in Pacific 
Northwestern that surveyed the legislative history of section 
8(e). In that earlier opinion, ACCD Construction Equipment, 
Inc. v. NLRB, the Ninth Circuit panel focused on the peculiar 
nature of the construction industry, which involves a variety of 
crafts, and numerous subcontractors working continuously 
alongside one another, as the source of congressional concern. no 
The Ninth Circuit dissenters also relied on legislative com-
ment to the effect that section 8(e) addressed the jobsite han-
dling of materials fabricated by nonunion members.11l The au-
thor of the overturned three-judge panel decision had pointedly 
stated: U[T]he broad assertion that the construction industry 
proviso was designed. to leave the law unchanged is inaccu-
rate."111 The opinion further maintained that union signatory 
subcontracting clauses had not been adjudged lawful at the time 
of the proviso's passage.ua In the three-judge panel's estimation, 
at least two changes occurred as a result of the interaction be-
tween Sand Doorll4 and the proviso. First, Congress added a 
jobsite restriction, an element not addressed in Sand Door. n. 
Second, Congress stated that the proviso did not protect agree-
ments concerning jobsite handling of non-union materials, 
whereas Sand Door had found such agreements lawful.lI• 
109. ACCO Constr. Equip., Inc. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1975) (per Choy, 
C.J.). 
110. Id. at 851. Judge Sneed's excerpt from ACCO appeara at 609 F.2d at 1349. 
Soon after the events surrounding the enactment of § 8(e), Professor Cox remarked: 
The fact that CODgreBB rejected the attacka upon the sec· 
ondary boycott provisions of the Landrum·Griffin bill which 
alleged that the bill unwisely threw doubt upon the validity of 
bona fide restrictions upon subcontracting, may be attributed 
to disbelief in the allegation just as easily as to congreBBional 
opposition to contractual restrictions upon managerial free· 
dom to subcontract, although there are undoubtedly individu· 
als who hoped also to resolve the Bubcontracting issue in favor 
of management. 
Cox, supra note 77, at 273. See also Goldberg & Meiklejohn, supra note 35, at 771-72. 
111. 654 F.2d at 1326. 
112. Pacific Northwest Chapter v. NLRB, 609 F.2d 1341, 1349 (9th Cir. 1979). The 
opinion is by Judge Sneed, who diBBented from the limited en banc decision. 
113. Id. 
114. Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB (Sand Door), 357 U.S. 93 
(1958). 
115. 609 F.2d at 1349. 
116. rd. 
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D. SIGNIFICANCE: AN IMPORTANT LABOR PRACTICE TAMED 
RATHER THAN OUTLAWED 
National labor policy considerations and the historical con-
text underlying section 8(e) mandated the Ninth Circuit's rever-
sal of the three-judge panel. Though the Connell opinion stated 
that, with the enactment of section 8(e), Congress did not intend 
to preserve a pattern of bargaining practices,11'7 the question of 
what manner of union signatory subcontracting clauses are law-
ful remained unanswered. With Pacific Northwest, the Ninth 
Circuit fashioned a reasonable accommodation between the con-
cerns outlined in Connell and congressional recognition of the 
unique conditions of the construction industry. The Landrum-
Griffin Act reflects congressional concessions to the construction 
industry beyond the labor tranquility rationale, acknowledging 
economic realities at construction jobsites. 
Unlike the purely secondary goals of the union in Connell, 
these subcontracting agreements seek to standardize working 
conditions of a signatory contractor's employees. us By recogniz-
ing this primary union concern, the Ninth Circuit joins the Dis-
trict of Columbia and Third Circuits.ll9 The overturned three-
judge panel opinion failed due to its singular preoccupation with 
jobsite friction and "top-down" organizing, overlooking legisla-
tive concern for construction industry unions. lao The limited en 
117. 421 U.S. at 628. 
118. See text accompanying notes 93-99 supra. 
119. Donald Shriver, Inc. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Larry V. Muko, 
Inc. v. Southwestern Pa. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 609 F.2d 1368 (3d Cir. 1979). 
The holding in Donald Shriver firmly supports the Ninth Circuit decision. Cited fre-
quently in Pacific Northwest, it contains a forceful exposition of analysis similar to the 
Ninth Circuit's. The District of Columbia Circuit held: (1) a § 8(0 prehire agreement is a 
sufficient collective bargaining relationship to invoke the construction industry proviso, 
635 F.2d at 875; (2) union signatory subcontracting provisions may extend to jobsites 
where union members are not present, id. at 881; and, (3) such provisions may designate 
particular unions, id. at 885. The Donald Shriver court, as did the Ninth Circuit, recog· 
nized the primary union goal of standardized working conditions in addition to the 
avoidance of common jobsite labor friction. Id. at 873. For a comparison of Donald 
Shriver and the overturned panel opinion in Pacific Northwest, see Note, Hot Cargo 
Agreements in the Construction Industry: Restraints on Subcontracting Under the Pro-
viso to Section 8(e), 1981 DUKE L.J. 141 (1981). 
120. See Note, Hot Cargo Contracts in the Construction Industry: Pacific North· 
west Chapter, Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 17 WILLAMETTE L. RBv. 
741 (1981) (describing the opinion as "strained"). 
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banc opinion defines limits to "top-down" organizing while ade-
quately providing for the community of interests displayed at 
the jobsite. 
Tom C. Clark 
IV. THE PICKET AND THE PROPERTY OWNER 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Seattle-First National Bank v. NLRB,1 the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that a union may picket on private property in order to 
effectively communicate its message in support of an economic 
strike! Since economic strike activity is central to section 7 
rights under the National Labor Relations Act (the Act),1 pick-
eting related to that activity is restricted less than is organiza-
tional or area standards picketing. Consequently, this court 
would not hold a union involved in economic activity picketing 
to the same high burden of proof applicable to other picketing 
activities.· However, even though a union may picket on private 
property, the property owner's rights must be protected by 
properly restricting the number of pickets and their conduct.' 
B. FACTS 
Seattle-First National Bank (the Bank) owns a fifty-story 
office building in Seattle, Washington. The Bank occupies ap-
proximately one-third of the building, and leases the remainder 
to commercial, professional and retail-trade tenants. During 
1978, the Mirabeau Restaurant (the Restaurant) leased space on 
1. 651 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Sneed, J.; the other panel members were 
Fletcher, J. and Jameson, D.J., sitting by designation). 
. 2. Id. at 1275. 
3. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act reads in part: "Employees shall 
have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain 
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion .... " 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). 
4. 651 F.2d at 1276. For organizational or area standards picketing unions must 
prove that no other reasonable means of communication exists. Id. An economic strike, 
such as that engaged in here, is defined as "a work stoppage ... , typically in support of 
bargaining demands regarding wages and working conditions . . . ." R. GORHAM, BASIC 
TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, 339 (1976). 
5. 651 F.2d at 1277. 
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the forty-sixth floor of the building, along with a stock brokerage 
firm. The Bank retained exclusive control of the foyer on that 
floor which was open to the pUblic. The foyer, in addition to pro-
viding access to the businesses located on that floor, was used by 
persons changing elevators to continue to the forty-seventh floor 
and above.s 
In April 1978, the Restaurant began negotiations with the 
Hotel, Motel, Restaurant Employees and Bartenders'Union Lo-
cal 8, AFL-CIO (the Union) for a new collective-bargaining 
agreement. On July 14, two days after discontinuing negotia-
tions, and after having failed to reach a new agreement, the 
Union began an economic strike against the Restaurant.7 
The Union stationed pickets, who carried placards and dis-
tributed leaflets and information to the public, at all entrances 
to the building. In addition, the union assigned one or two per-
sons to distribute leaflets in front of the Restaurant in the forty-
sixth floor foyer during lunch and dinner hours.8 
On the first day of the strike, the Bank demanded that the 
pickets leave the foyer and threatened them with arrest for tres-
pass. The pickets refused to leave and the Bank sought an in-
junction in state court barring access to the forty-sixth floor. 
The state court stayed its proceedings, holding that its jurisdic-
tion had been pre-empted when the Union filed unfair labor 
practice charges against the Bank with the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (the NLRB).' 
Based on the Union's charge, the NLRB General Counsel 
issued a complaint against the Bank on August 25, 1978. The 
6. Id. at 1273. 
7. Although the Restaurant was the primary employer, it was not a party to this 
dispute. The Bank entered this action as the property owner, but was also recognized by 
the NLRB as an employer under the Act.ld. n.2. The Bank also had an interest in the 
outcome of the original conflict between the Restaurant and the Union because the rent 
paid by the Restaurant was based on a percentage of monthly gross sales. Consequently, 
the Bank lost rental income during the strike. Brief for Respondent at 7 n.4. 
8. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 243 N.L.R.B. 898 (1979). 
9. 651 F.2d at 1273. Since the Union did not file an unfair labor practice charge 
until after the Bank sought injunctive relief in state court, the state court may not have 
been pre-empted from proceeding. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 
(1980). However, since this issue was not under review in this case, the court offered no 
opinion. 
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complaint alleged unfair labor practices under section 8(a)(1) of 
the Act,IO based solely on the Bank's threat to arrest the pickets 
on the forty-sixth floor of its building. l1 
A three-member panel of the NLRB considered the issuesll 
and found in favor of the Union, holding that the Bank's threat 
of arrest violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act.1lI The NLRB found 
that the Bank's property rights must yield to the Union's section 
7 rights and that the Union had the right to issue leaflets and 
discuss its dispute with the public in the foyer of the forty-sixth 
floor of the Bank's building. 
The NLRB ordered the Bank to allow the picketing to con-
tinue and to post in the foyer a notice of intent not to interfere 
with those strike activities. U The Bank petitioned the circuit 
court of appeals for review of the NLRB's order; the NLRB con-
currently filed for enforcement. III 
c. BACKGROUND 
The activity of pickets on private property has exposed the 
conflict between the picketer's right to engage in protected ac-
tivity as defined by the Actle and the property owner's right to 
the free and unencumbered use and enjoyment of his property}' 
However, when that property owner has used his property in a 
public manner, transforming it into "quasi-public" property, la-
bor activists have argued, and the courts have agreed, that the 
10. Section 8(a)(1) provides in part: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer-(l) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights 
guaranteed in section 157 of this title .... " 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)(1976). 
11. 651 F.2d at 1274. 
12. Both parties stipulated to the facts, waived a hearing before an Administrative 
Law Judge, and waived all oral testimony. The proceedings were transfered directly to 
the NLRB, where they were reviewed by Chairman Fanning, and Board members Jen-
kins and Murphy. 243 N.L.R.B. at 898. 
13. rd. at 899. 
14. rd. at 900. 
15. 651 F.2d at 1274. 
16. For the activities defined in the Act as being protected, see note 3 supra. 
17. In contrast, the right to picket on public property has been the subject of exten-
sive litigation and has evolved from a constitutionally protected right based on the first 
and fourteenth amendments, Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), to a statutorily 
regulated and protected activity under the Act. Picketing on public property is also gen-
erally considered immune from state regulation by virtue of federal preemption. See note 
9 supra. For a further discussion of the judicial review of picketing, see R. GORMAN, 
supra note 4, at 211-13. 
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property owner has relinquished his right to sole control of that 
property.18 
Using precedent established in cases related to soliciting as 
well as to picketing, employees originally relied on first amend-
ment principles to protect their right to picket on private prop-
erty.11 A balancing approach emerged in NLRB v. Babcock & 
Wilcox, CO.IO Although decided a quarter of a century ago, Bab-
cock & Wilcox still controls conflicts arising from union activi-
ties on private property. In Babcock & Wilcox, non-employee 
union organizers attempted to distribute leaflets in a company-
owned parking lot. The Court held that because both property 
rights and employees' organizational rights are protected, bOth 
must be accommodated. But, in the final analysis, the property 
owner's right to exclude must yield to the employees' rights, 
should no other reasonable alternative exist.1I 
18. "Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more an owner, for 
his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his 
rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use 
it." Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946) (Black, J.). 
19. In Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), the Supreme Court extended 6nt 
amendment protection to a religious leatleter in a company town which had all the char-
acteristics of any other town and was indistinguishable from public property. In AmaJa-
gated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968), the Court 
found the "functional equivalent of the business district in Marsh" in a shopping center. 
Id. at 318. Consequently, first amendment protection was extended to labor unions pick-' 
eting there. 
The first amendment protection began to shrink, however, in Lloyd v. Tanner, f.fY1 
U.S. 551 (1972):The Lloyd Court distinguished Logan Valley on the facts, claiming that 
the picketing in Logan Valley was protected by the first amendment because the activity 
of the pickets was related to the center's operation. The activity of the anti-war leatleten 
in Lloyd was totally unrelated to that center's operation; no first amendment protection 
was applicable. The Court also held that Lloyd Center's open-to-the-public policy did 
not destroy the private character of the center or equate it to a municipal business dis-
trict. Id. at 569. In Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 538 (1972), announced the 
same day as Lloyd, the Court again questioned the "functional equivalent" test of Mania 
and Logan Valley. The Court held that, unlike shopping centers, single unit stores could 
not be described as a community business block. Firat amendment principles do DOt 
apply to this case because the property did not "assume, to some significant degree, the 
functional attributes of public property devoted to public use." Id. at 547. The issues in 
Central Hardware must be resolved as directed by § 7 of the Act. . 
20. 351 U.S. 105 (1956). 
21. Organizational rights are granted to workers by the same au-
thority, the National Government, that preserves property 
rights. Accommodation between the two must be obtained 
with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the main-
tenance of the other . . . . The right to exclude from property 
has been required to yield to the extent needed to permit com-
53
Slizeski et al.: Labor Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1982
300 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:296 
The accommodation requirement of Babcock & Wilcox was 
quoted with favor by the Court in Hudgens v. NLRB.II In Hud-
gens, striking warehouse employees of the Butler Shoe Company 
began to picket the company's retail outlets. One store was lo-
cated within the North DeKalb Shopping Center, in Atlanta, 
Georgia, a shopping center containing sixty stores housed in one 
large building with an enclosed mall. Since the shoe store could 
only be entered from the mall, the pickets stationed themselves 
outside the store, but inside the mall. They left after being 
threatened with arrest, and the union filed unfair labor practice 
charges against the shopping center.1I 
With Hudgens, the Supreme court eliminated the claim of 
first amendment protection for picketing, remanded to the 
NLRB for consideration under sections 7 and 8(a)(l) of the Act, 
and directed that the accommodation required by Babcock & 
Wilcox be applied." 
D. HOLDING OF THE COURT 
The Ninth Circuit in Seattle-First National Bank v. NLRB 
relied on the Supreme Court decision in Hudgens and its in-
struction that the NLRB must apply the standards of the Act to 
the facts of cases of this genre and not rely on first amendment 
principles.1II Additionally, the rights guaranteed the union under 
the Act, when in conflict with the rights of the property owner, 
must be resolved under the Babcock & Wilcox standard." 
The significant fact situation found by the NLRB in its re-
view of Hudgens on remand was also found by the Ninth Circuit 
in Seattle-First National Bank. In both cases, it was asserted 
that the picketers were only able to identify their intended audi-
ence at the time the public actually entered the specific business 
munication on the right to organize. 
ld. at 112. 
22. 424 U.S. 507, 521 (1976). 
23. ld. at 509-10. 
24. ld. at 522. The Court also concluded that Lloyd v. Tanner had overruled Logan 
Valley. See note 19 supra. The Court stated that "under the present state of the law the 
constitutional guarantee of free expression has no part to play in a case such as this. II 
424 U.S. at 521. 
25. 651 F.2d at 1274. 
26. ld. at 1276. For a discUSBion of the Babcock & Wilcox standard, see note 21 
supra and accompanying text. 
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being picketed, not at the time potential customers entered the 
mall (Hudgens) or the bank building (Seattle-First National 
Bank).2? Picketing on the street outside the bank building, while 
informing all persons entering the building of the labor dispute 
with the Restaurant, did not adequately reach those persons 
who, after having been in the building on other business, de-
cided to eat at the Restaurant. The court noted this was particu-
larly true of workers in the building who entered the premises 
early in the day, and had forgotten the pickets' message by the 
lunch hour. The court concluded that to deny pickets access to 
the forty-sixth floor foyer substantially damaged their rights 
under section 7 since this location was the only effective site (or 
the union to convey its message to its intended audience." 
The court noted that the Bank had opened the foyer to the 
public as part of its invitation to patronize the Restaurant. In 
addition, there was no evidence that the presence of the pickets 
on the forty-sixth floor had been intrusive in any way or had 
denied the public or other tenants their expected use of this 
property. Therefore, the property rights of the Bank had to 
yield to accommodate the free exercise of the union's section 7 
rights." 
The court was also swayed by the finding that the union was 
picketing in support of an economic strike.so The court recog-
nized that organizational and area standards picketing are sub-
ject to greater restrictions,81 but that since U[t]he right to picket 
27. Scott Hudgens and Local 315, 230 N.L.R.B. 414, 416 (1977); Seattle-First Nat'} 
Bank v. NLRB, 651 F.2d at 1275. 
28. 651 F.2d at 1275·76. 
29. All evidence indicated that the pickets on the forty-sixth floor had been miDi-
mally intrusive. The Union had stationed no more than two pickets in the area at a time. 
They had not carried banners or placards, but had distributed handbills which they also 
held in front of themselves to form a picket line. Id. at 1277. 
30. Id. at 1273. 
31. Section 8(b)(7) of the Act restricts certain types of organizational picketing. 29 
U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1976). Organizational picketing involves non-employees 88 weD 88 
employees. In addition, the audience toward whom organizational picketing is directed 
(the employees of the targeted company) is different from that of an economic picket 
line (the customers and the employees of the targeted company). For a discussion of the 
distinction between organizational and economic picketing and the intended audience, 
see Scott Hudgens, 230 N.L.R.B. 414, 416 (1977). See also Note, Focusing on Labor 
Pickets' Rights In Shopping Centers With A Section 7 Lens~Scott Hudgens, 27 D. 
PAUL L. REV. 1287 (1978). Area standards picketing is conducted by non-employees and 
is directed at employees and customers. For a recent examination of area standard pick-
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in support of an economic strike is at the core of section 7,"11 a 
greater accommodation of the property owner's rights would 
have to be made. 
The court did agree with the Bank that the foyer of the 
forty-sixth Boor could not be properly compared to a shopping 
center mall, like the one in Hudgens." The NLRB's order as 
issued was judged too broadly written to properly protect Bank 
property from damage or unnecessary abuse." Consequently, 
the court remanded to the NLRB in order to place appropriate 
limits on the union's activity within the Bank's building." 
E. CRITIQUE 
In Seattle-First National Bank, the Ninth Circuit has sup-
ported the NLRB in expanding the application of section 7 
rights available to labor organizations by allowing picketing 
within an office building. This is a logical response to the socio-
economic trends which have produced shopping centers, indus-
trial parks and multi-tenant, high-rise office buildings. Indeed, 
the Board has no choice but to insist that those persons whose 
employment is located in leased space on private property be 
granted the same rights as those whose employer is the owner 
and single occupant of a free-standing building. To do otherwise 
would "render section 7 meaningleBB."N 
The ramifications of this development, however, could cre-
ate some unpleasant problems for private property owners who 
until now have not faced these situations. For example, the long 
standing practice of the NLRB has been that pickets may not 
demonstrate within a store.·7 However, modern retailers, in 
many cases, stand in shoes similar to those of shopping center 
developers or office building owners since they are not always 
the primary employers of persons working in their buildings. It 
eting, see Giant Foot Mkts. v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 18 (6th Cir. 1981). 
32. 651 F.2d at 1276. 
33. "The mall in Hudgens was apparently quite long .... The foyer is both smaller 
and normally quieter." ld. at 1277. 
34.Id. 
35.Id. 
36. Scott Hudgens, 230 N.L.R.B. at 418. 
37. Marshall Field & Co. v. NLRB, 200 F.2d 375 (1953). See also Bonwit Teller, 
Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 608 (1951); J.L. Hudson Co., 67 N.L.R.B. 1403 (1946); May Dep't 
Stores Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 976 (1944). 
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is not unusual for department store owners, who attempt to 
reach a wide variety of customers, to distribute some of their 
operation, such as beauty salons or restaurants, to specialists 
who provide these unique services which the store is unable or 
unwilling to undertake. These leased departments rent space 
within the landlord store, often on a rate determined as a per-
cent of sales.88 The lessee or tenant benefits by sharing in the 
customer traffic provided by the landlord store, as well as vari-
ous other services, which may include security, utilities, credit 
service and sales promotion. The landlord store benefits from 
the direct rental income and from the additional services offered 
by the tenant which enhances the landlord's customer relations. 
In this situation, the landlord store is not the employer of 
the lessee's employees. The lessee pays its employees directly, 
provides all benefits and negotiations with any unions involved 
in its operation. However, if the lessee is unable to bargain satis-
factorily with its employees' representatives, then based on Se-
attle-First National Bank, the store can expect pickets to patrol 
both the exterior and interior public areas of its building." If 
the tenant is renting space in the basement of the store for use 
as a restaurant, the union representing its employees could sta-
tion pickets outside the entrance to the restaurant, in the land-
lord's basement. Should the landlord object, and threaten the 
pickets with arrest for trespass, the union can file an unfair la-
bor practice charge against the landlord and, as in Seattle-First 
National Bank, the state courts are likely to dismiss the issue on 
the basis of federal pre-emption.40 The store could find itself in 
an unpleasant labor relations conflict even though it may have 
been very successful in negotiating with the union representing 
its own employees. 
The store might argue that it is unjustified to treat one 
small department within its building as one would treat an inde-
pendent store within a shopping center. In addition, one cannot 
compare the basement of a department store with the mall or a 
modern shopping center. This argument had some impact on the 
38. Such an agreement existed between the Bank and the Restaurant in Seattle-
First National Bank. See Brief for Respondent at 7, n.4. 
39. See notes 28 and 29 supra and accompanying text. 
40. See note 9 supra and accompanying text. 
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court in Seattle-First National Bank.41 
The Ninth Circuit recognized the differences between the 
Bank's forty-sixth floor foyer and a shopping center mall; conse-
quently, it instructed the NLRB to limit its order to the Bank 
accordingly." The court noted that the Union had not damaged 
the Bank's property or disturbed other businesses in the build-
ing and in fact had acted with moderation and restraint. How-
ever, the court insisted that the NLRB set proper limits on 
union activity. The court's warning is clear: It will enforce the 
NLRB's orders when the NLRB finds that section 7 rights have 
been infringed upon by employers. However, at the same time, 
the NLRB must make the necessary accommodation to the pri-
vate property owner's rights as required by Babcock & Wilcox 
and Hudgens. That accommodation cannot be assumed, but 
must be specincallyexpressed in the NLRB's order as to the 
number of pickets acceptable and the range of activity allowed.4I 
This is the one safeguard that the property owner can rely 
upon. His building, be it shopping center, office building or de-
partment store, can be invaded by union activists who can pick-
et under his own roof. The NLRB must limit that union activity 
to the extent necessary to prevent property loss or damage. 
F. CONCLUSION 
High-rise, and multi-tenant office buildings, like shopping 
centers, are modem developments which encouraged employers 
to band together in lease agreements for mutual convenience 
and profit. The Ninth Circuit has held that employees' rights 
under the National Labor Relations Act may not be circum-
vented by a lessor-employer's reliance on a third-party owner's 
private property interests." 
The Ninth Circuit has extended the employees' right to 
picket to the interior of the building in which the employer has 
leased space, and is willing to allow that activity forty-six floors 
41. 651 F.2d at 1277. See comparison made by the court in note 33 supra. 
42. 651 F.2d at 1277. 
43. It was on this issue that Judge Fletcher based his dissent, claiming that the 
court's restriction here, absent any evidence of illegal picketing, is outside the court's 
jurisdiction. [d. at 1278. 
44. ld. at 1276. 
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above the street. This activity is justified to enable the union to 
reach its intended audience on the employers' actual doorstep. 
The court insists, however, that the NLRB, while protecting the 
employees' rights, also accomodate the property owner's rights 
to the fullest extent necessary. fit 
Alice Guckeen 
V. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN LABOR LAW 
In other significant decisions last term, the court devised 
new "willfulness" tests for two statutes, expressed a rather ex-
pansive view of federal statutory jurisdiction and adopted a per 
se rule regarding employer requests for employee statements 
given in conjunction with unfair labor practice investigations. 
A. WILLFULNESS STANDARD 
In Marshall v. Union Pacific Motor Freight Co., 1 the court 
in a per curiam opinion adopted a willfulness standard for viola-
tions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. As a consequence, neither 
a good faith belief by the employer in the lawfulness of the em-
ployer's wage and overtime policies nor complete ignorance of 
the Act's provisions will shield the employer with immunity. In 
Kelly v. American Standard, Inc.,' the court required only a 
knowing and voluntary violation to find willfulness under the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act. 
1. Marshall v. Union Pacific Motor Freight Co. 
In Union Pacific, the Secretary. of Labor sought to enjoin 
the Union Pacific Motor Freight Company (the Company) from 
failing to pay past and future overtime compensation to its dis-
patchers. The Secretary contended that the Company's failure 
to pay overtime violated section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act (FLSA),' and that the violation was willful, so that the 
45. ld. at 1277. 
1. 650 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam). 
2. 640 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Boochever, J.). 
3. Section 7 of the Act provides that: 
Except as otherwise provided in this section, no employer 
shall employ any of his employees ... for a workweek longer 
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three-year rather than the two-year statute of limitations ap-
plied.· The Company countered that its dispatchers were ex-
empt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA because their 
duties "affect the safety of operations of vehicles used in inter-
state commerce" and were, therefore, regulated by the Secretary 
of Transportation.1I 
The district court accepted the Company's arguments, find-
ing that the dispatchers were exempt from the FLSA overtime 
provisions, and, alternatively, that the Company's failure to pay 
was not "willful." The Ninth Circuit reversed on both grounds. 
No exemption 
The Company operates as a motor carrier in interstate com-
merce and handles freight which moves in part by rail. The dis-
patchers perform both inside and outside duties. The job of 
outside dispatcher was created to control unsafe and congested 
conditions in the terminal. Dispatchers also are responsible in 
part for implementing federal regulations on the transportation 
of hazardous materials and ensuring that containers and vehicles 
transporting hazardous materials are properly placarded. Based 
on these limited dispatcher duties, the Company contended that 
it, as an employer, was exempt from the FLSA's overtime regu-
lations,6 because implementing regulations "necessarily involves 
the performance of duties that directly affect safety of opera-
tion.'" The panel rejected that argument because of a long-
standing determination by the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion that the primary duties of dispatchers do not bring them 
within the exemption.8 The court explained that, were the com-
than forty hours, unless such employee receives compensation 
for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a 
rate not le88 than one and one·half times the regular rate at 
which he is employed. 
29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1976). 
4. Id. § 255(a). 
5. 650 F.2d at 1087. The Secretary's authority is found in 49 U.S.C. § 304 (1976). 
6. The jurisdiction of the Secretary of Transportation under the Motor Carriers Act 
extends only to "those employees [of common carriers) whose activities affect the safety 
of operation." 650 F.2d at 1089 (quoting United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 
Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 553 (1940) (emphasis added)). 
7. 650 F.2d at 1090. 
8. The Commission applies a proximate cause test. While judgments in error by dis-
patchers may be contributing factors to subsequent accidents, they are never the proxi-
mate cause of the accidents. 650 F.2d at 1090 n.9. 
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pany's view accepted, any employer could be exempted from the 
overtime provisions of the FLSA simply by dividing among his 
employees those safety inspection and enforcement duties im-
posed by governmental regulations. 
Willfulness 
Under the FLSA, an action for overtime pay must be 
brought within two years of the time the cause of action ac-
crues-unless the violation is "willful";' a willful action may be 
commenced within three years.10 The Ninth Circuit had not pre-
viously adopted a standard for determining whether violations 
of the Act are willful. The court expanded the views taken by 
the District of Columbiall and Fifthll Circuits. Both those cir-
cuits hold that an employer is not relieved of its obligation to 
comply with the FLSA merely because of the employer's own 
error.18 The Fifth Circuit holds further that reliance on the ad-
vice of counsel is no shield.14 The Ninth Circuit standard is 
somewhat stricter. In this circuit, 
[a] violation is willful when the employer was, or 
should have been, cognizant of an appreciable 
possibility that the employees involved were cov-
ered by the statutory provisions. Reliance on erro-
neous advice is no bar to a finding of a "willful" 
violation, except for good faith reliance upon ad-
9. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (1976). 
10.ld. 
11. In the District of Columbia Circuit, noncompliance is willful when the employer 
"is cognizant of an appreciable possibility that he may be subject to the statutory re-
quirements and fails to take steps reasonably calculated to resolve the doubt ... [or] 
when an equally aware employer consciously and voluntarily charts a course which turns 
out to be wrong." Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1976), 
quoted in Marshall v. Union Pac. Motor Freight Co., 650 F.2d at 1092. . 
12. The Fifth Circuit test is similar: "[A]n employer acts willfully and subjects him-
self to the three-year liability provision if he knows or has reason to know, that his con-
duct is governed by the Fair Labor Standards Act." Brennan v. Heard, 491 F.2d I, 3 (5th 
Cir. 1974) (emphasis in original), quoted in Marshall v. Union Pac. Motor Freight Co., 
650 F.2d at 1092. 
13. In Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), the employer 
was familiar with the statutory provisions but erroneously concluded that they did not 
apply. See 650 F.2d at 1092. In Brennan v. Heard, 491 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1974), the em-
ployer had reason to suspect the statute applied to him. The employer's unwillingness to 
determine the statutory obligation did not protect him from the extra year of liability. 
See Marshall v. Union Pac. Motor Freight Co., 650 F.2d at 1092. 
14. Coleman v. Jiffy June Farms, Inc., 458 F.2d 1139, 1141-42 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972). 
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vice rendered by an appropriate government 
agency.u 
The court has put employers on notice that neither the em-
ployer's own error, its assertion of ignorance of the Act's require-
ments, nor reliance on the advice of counsel will shield the em-
ployer from a finding of willfulness. Good faith reliance on the 
erroneous advice of an appropriate government agency, however, 
would not make a violation willful. 
The opinion seems correct. The three-year statute of limita-
tions of the FLSA serves to prevent an employer from forestall-
ing a lawsuit by misleading its employees of rights available 
under the FLSA. Accordingly, neither ignorance, erroneous in-
terpretation, nor reliance on the advice of its own counsel should 
be a bar when the employer has reason to mislead the employee. 
2. Kelley u. American Standard, Inc. 
In Kelly u. American Standard. Inc., Ie the Ninth Circuit 
adopted a somewhat different willfulness standard for violations 
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)17 and re-
manded to the district court for redetermination of the willful-
ness of the employer's actions. 
Kelly, the employee, was a territorial sales representative 
for defendant-employer American Standard, Incorporated of Se-
attle from 1954 to 1975. American reduced its sales force by 
forty employees in 1975, including one employee in the Seattle 
district. Kelly was the Seattle employee terminated. Plaintiff, 
fifty-seven years old, contended he was discharged because of his 
age-an allegation the employer denied. 
The case was tried to a jury which found in favor of Kelly 
and awarded $48,500 in damages. The court then awarded 
$14,000 attorneys fees but denied Kelly'S request for liquidated 
damages under the ADEA, finding that American had not acted 
"willfully,"18 and that the "good faith" defenselt under ADEA 
15. Marshall v. Union Pac. Motor Freight Co., 650 F.2d at 1092-93. 
16. 640 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Boochever, J.). 
17. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976». 
18. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976). Section 626(b) limite liquidated damages to willful 
violations. 
19. [d. § 260. 
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applied. 
The willfulness test adopted by the Ninth Circuit for dis-
crimination requires only a knowing and voluntary violation of 
the Act to entitle the plaintiff to liquidated damages.lo The 
panel rejected the test employed by the district court which re-
quired specific intent and knowledge of ADEA implications. The 
court reasoned that to require knowledge of implications under 
the Act could have the anomalous effect of encouraging employ-
ers to know as little as possible about the ADEA so that they 
would not be liable for liquidated damages. 
The defendaIit objected to the adoption of the lower stan-
dard, and argued that such an approach would make liquidated 
damages automatic.II In a footnote, the panel declined to extend 
the provisions of double damages to reckless violations, an ap-
proach urged by the Third Circuit. II The panel then dismissed 
the defendant's argument on the grounds that an employer's act 
could violate the ADEA, without being knowing and voluntary.1I 
However, defendant's contention remains unanswered. For ex-
ample, a plaintiff need not present evidence of the defendant's 
state of mind to establish a basis for liability.l. Statistical evi-
dence can be used to establish a prima facie case, and, in fact, is 
often the only evidence available to a discharged employee.1I 
Statistical evidence can now also be used to establish willfulness 
under the "knowing and voluntary" standard. IS Kelly introduced 
statistical evidence and testified to discriminatory statements 
made by, American's employees. I? The panel held that either 
type of evidence might establish willfulness under a "knowing 
and voluntary" standard entitling the plaintiff to liquidated 
damages. IS The panel recognized that the discrimination might 
be inadvertent, however; hence it remanded for a redetermina-
tion by the district court, but without any guidance on how to 
20. 640 F.2d at 980. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. n.7 (citing Wehr v. Burrough Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 280 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(dictum)). 
23. Id. at 980. 
24.Id. 
25. Id. n.9. 
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distinguish between inadvertent and knowing violations. 
Good faith defense 
The court found further that the good faith defense of the 
Fair Labor Standards Actle did not apply to ADEA actions be-
cause it was not specifically incorporated by reference in the sec-
tion dealing with willfulness.8o Under the FLSA there is no req-
uisite of a showing of willfulness.81 Because the willfulness 
requirement was added to the ADEA, the court believed the 
good faith defense was not necessary and held that the good 
faith defense to liquidated damages was not applicable to ADEA 
actions. 
B. FEDERAL STATUTORY JURISDICTION 
1. Usery v. Lacy 
The Ninth Circuit issued two decisions this term evincing a 
very expansive view of federal statutory jurisidiction. In Usery v. 
Lacy (Aqua View),8. the court held ti)at all who employ con-
struction workers8s are subject to regulation by the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act (the Act)" as embracing the full range of 
congressional power under the commerce clause. The opinion 
raises the question whether any employer is exempt from regula-
tion by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA).811 
Defendant Lacy did not engage in a business directly affect-
ing commerce. Lacy owned, operated and maintained a small 
apartment building. He hired' approximately forty workers, 
mostly students on a part-time basis, to construct a fifteen-unit 
apartment addition. The Secretary of Labor was unable to show 
that any materials Lacy used had been in interstate commerce. at 
29. 29 U.S.C. § 260 (1976). 
30. Jd. § 626(b). 
31. 640 F.2d at 981. 
32. 628 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Kennedy J.). 
33. Jd. at 1228 n.l. 
34. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976). 
35. 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (1976) defines as an employer any "person engaged in a busi-
ness affecting commerce who has employees .... " Domestic activity is excluded. 29 
C.F.R. § 1975.6 (1980). 
36. Some of the lumber came from Weyerhaeuser, the defendant's saw was made by 
Craftsman, and he drove a Ford station wagon. The Secretary failed to show that any of 
64
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 11
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol12/iss1/11
1982] LABOR LAW 311 
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) declined to take judicial 
notice that Weyerhaeuser and Sears are engaged in interstate 
commerce and that the possession of a single "Craftsman" drill 
and a piece of plywood with the name "Weyerhaeuser" on it 
meant defendant Lacy was "engaged in a business affecting com-
merce."S7 Accordingly, the ALJ dismissed the complaint. The 
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) 
affirmed. 
Reversing the OSHRC, the Ninth Circuit distinguished two 
types of statutory jurisdiction in the employment relations area. 
When a statute concerns businesses" 'in commerce,' a fairly spe-
cific showing must be made,,;s8 but when a statute only requires 
that a particular business "affects" commerce, statutory jurisdic-
tion is much broader and exists "so long as the business is in a 
class of activity that as a whole affects commerce."ss OSHA ju-
risdiction falls in the latter category. 
The court reasoned that OSHA regulations cover all em-
ployers, with some specific inapplicable exceptions, and that the 
opinion was consistent with OSHA regulations and congressional 
intent to reach as broadly as possible because non-uniform cov-
erage would give unsafe employers a competitive advantage.·o 
Because the construction business normally affects commerce, 
and construction of an apartment building is an activity of the 
same type, the court concluded that hiring forty workers to con-
struct a fifteen-unit apartment building was a business that af-
fects commerce as a matter of law. 
In a footnote, the panel took judicial notice of the position 
unsuccessfully argued by OSHA's counsel before the ALJ: 
Respondent Lacy testified that he used material 
and tools manufactured by Weyerhaeuser and 
Craftsman (Sears Roebuck). The use of material 
that has at any point moved in commerce is 
enough to establish that a business affects com-
merce, and it is appropriate to take judicial notice 
these were manufactured out of state. See 628 F.2d at 1233. 
37. [d. at 1234. 
38. [d. at 1228. 
39. [d. 
40. [d. at 1229. 
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Dissent 
of the fact that Lacy's ultimate suppliers, Weyer-
haeuser and Sears, are engaged in the production 
and distribution of goods for commerce.4) 
In a lengthy dissent, District Judge Kelleher objected to the 
panel's broad reading of a statutory jurisdiction. Much of the 
dissent is given over to a reiteration of the facts and testimony 
before the ALJ, and the proper scope of appellate review. The 
dissent relied heavily on two earlier opinions of this cir-
cuit-Hiatt v. Schlecht,'" and E.B. Weber v. Hiatt.'s Schlecht 
held that where a plumbing contractor's business was totally in-
trastate, a showing that plumbing fixtures used by the contrac-
tor were manufactured out of state was insufficient to establish 
jurisdiction over the business as one "affecting commerce."" 
The dissent also relied on another Ninth Circuit opinion, 
Godwin v. OSHRC.4& which involved safety citations for farm 
machinery used to clear land upon which grapes were grown. 
Wine was produced from the grapes and the wine entered inter-
state commerce. Godwin in turn relied on Wickard v. Filburn,·· 
the landmark constitutional law case in which the Supreme 
Court applied the Agricultural Assistance Act of 1938 to wheat 
grown purely for home consumption. The dissent argued that 
because apartment buildings are neither raw materials nor goods 
which move in interstate commerce, Lacy's construction of an 
apartment did not lend itself to a Wickard analogy to the effect 
that production for home use "can skew the interstate flow of 
the product."" 
The decision in Aqua View seems correct. The fact that 
Lacy added fifteen units under his own supervision rather than 
hire a building contractor does not change the nature of the 
work and the seriousness of the hazards at the worksite. Fur-
thermore, Wickard can be read to support the panel's opinion 
41. [d. n.3. 
42. 400 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1968). 
43. 424 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1970). 
44. 400 F.2d at 877, cited in Usery v. Lacy, 628 F.2d at 1231 (Kelleher, D.J., 
dissenting). 
45. 540 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1973). 
46. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
47. 628 F.2d at 1232. 
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because non-uniform standards place employers who comply 
with safety regulations at a competitive disadvantage and ad-
versely affect the job market. 
Aqua View has apparently overruled Schlecht and Weber, 
although the precise reach of the opinion is unclear. The court 
hinted that even one part-time construction worker would be 
enough for the court to find statutory jurisdiction although it 
refused to speculate as to the applicability of the Act to the case 
of a handyman employed in the home.48 The panel explained 
that to the extent the employment looks less like a business in 
the conventional sense and more like domestic activity, which is 
specifically excluded from the act's coverage,·& the Secretary 
might be obligated to prove the nexus with commerce.ao 
2. NLRB v. Maxwell 
In NLRB v. Maxwell,al the court further eroded the signifi-
cance of Schlecht and held that Maxwell's purchase of goods, 
materials and supplies in excess of $6,000 from out of state had 
a sufficient effect on interstate commerce for the court to find 
statutory jurisdiction. The panel relied on NLRB v. Inglewood 
Park Cemetery Associational which held that $3,000 worth of 
interstate purchases was not de minimis and was adequate to 
support jurisdiction. The panel made no mention of Aqua View. 
Per se rule 
The court also adopted a per se rule regarding employer re-
quests of employee statements given· in conjunction with unfair 
labor practice investigations. The per se rule related to an unfair 
labor practice. The Administrative Law Judge and the National 
Labor Relations Board found that the employer (Maxwell) vio-
lated section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act by dis-
charging one employee and requesting another employee to de-
liver a copy of the written statement submitted by the second 
employee to the board during its investigation of the discharge. 
48. 1d. at 1228 n.l. 
49. 29 C.F.R. § 1975.6 (1980) .. 
50. 628 F.2d at 1228 n.l. 
51. 637 F.2d 698 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Canby, J.). 
52. 355 F.2d 448 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 951 (1966). 
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Maxwell is a sole proprietor, producing and selling ready 
mixed concrete and employing five drivers. One driver was fired 
in a dispute over a contract provision governing overtime pay. 
The ALJ found the driver was fired for insisting on compliance 
with terms of the collective bargaining agreement, and not, as 
the employer alleged, because of acrimonious shouting 
matches.1I8 
After the unfair labor practice charge was filed, Maxwell 
asked Bower, another employee, for a copy of the statement 
Bower gave to the Board. Maxwell gave no reassurance that no 
reprisals would be taken and did not show that he needed the 
statement for trial preparation. Bower complied with Maxwell's 
request and furnished the copy. The ALJ found Bower could not 
have refused the request and that Maxwell's actions violated 
section 8(a)(1).The Board concurred. 
The Ninth Circuit panel ruled that an employer request for 
an employee's statement is a per se violation of section 8(a)(1) 
when made (1) without reassurance that no reprisals will follow 
from refusal, and (2) without a showing that the requested state-
ment is needed for trial preparation, and that the employer is 
seeking only what is necessary for that purpose.1I4 The court 
chose not to impose a balancing test, weighing coercion against 
the employer's need for information.1I1I An analogous rule is em-
ployed in this circuit in the context of interrogation of employ-
ees with regard to union activities." 
The panel reasoned that a lesser standard than the one 
adopted would have a chilling, coercive effect on witness testi-
mony-particularly in the case of current, rank and file and su-
pervisory employees over whom the employer can exert intense, 
if subtle, pressures concerning promotions, salary increases, job 
assignments and hours. Employers are not likely to be seriously 
53. 637 F.2d at 701. 
54. Id. at 702. 
55.Id. 
56. Id. The permissibility of interrogation of employees about union activities de-
pends on whether the circumstances as a whole indicate restraint or coercion of employ-
ees exercising § 7 rights. NLRB v. Silver Spur Casino, 623 F.2d 571, 584-85 (9th Cir. 
1980); Penasquitos Village, Inc. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074, 1080 (9th Cir. 1977); but see 
NLRB v. Port Vancouver Plywood Co., 604 F.2d 596, 599 n.1 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. de-
nied, 445 U.S. 915 (1980). 
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prejudiced by the new rule because it permits access to the 
statements, to the extent they are necessary for the employer to 
prepare a trial defense. Further, the Board itself permits access 
to statements of employees who will be witnesses against the 
employer. 57 
57. 29 C.F.R. § 102.118(b) (1981). 
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